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INTRODUCTION
A coastal State is considering whether to adopt a proposal to es-
tablish a marine preserve around one of its small islands located
outside the State's twelve-mile territorial sea,' twenty-five miles
from its shore. The marine preserve would prohibit all develop-
ment, commercial or otherwise, within a three-mile radius around
that island. This proposal is presented by environmentalists con-
cerned about overfishing, traffic of oil tankers, and tourist-based
diving on a fragile coral reef located 500 meters from the island.
Opponents of the marine preserve argue that it defends the envi-
ronment at too great an economic cost. Instead, they propose con-
structing an offshore saline refinery, which they claim would bring
economic development without damaging the environment. Fur-
1. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 3, opened for
signature Dec. 20, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M.
1261 [hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention] (providing that every state has a
right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12
nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with the Con-
vention). A coastal state is sovereign over its territorial sea. Id. art. 2: see also
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 391 (4th ed. 1997) (observing the
"gradual shift" in the law of the sea towards enlargement of the territorial sea
from 3 to 12 miles).
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thermore, opponents of the preserve indicate that only their pro-
posal will expand the State's maritime jurisdiction under Article
121(3) of the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea
("UNCLOS III" or "Third UNCLOS"). Article 121(3) states that
"[rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of
their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf.",2 Adversaries of the marine preserve conclude that unless the
island is developed economically in a manner akin to their pro-
posal, it will be treated as a "rock" under Article 121(3).' As a re-
suit, the State's jurisdiction would be extended only for the twelve-
mile territorial sea around the rock, rather than the potential addi-
tional two hundred-mile exclusive economic zone ("EEZ") and
continental shelf6 generated by islands.
In response, advocates of the marine preserve present evidence
that the proposed refinery will cause significant environmental
damage. Moreover, the advocates contend that the preserve in fact
represents an economic use and creates, for the small island, an
"economic life of its own" within the meaning of Article 121(3).
Quantitative studies show that the optimal use of the island is to
leave it undeveloped. Thus, supporters of the preserve argue that
the preserve will yield economic benefits, not only through in-
creased sustainable yield in fishing, but also in the preservation of
biological diversity, which itself will lead both to new pharmaceu-
ticals and to consumer products such as cosmetics.
This hypothetical policy debate raises a fundamental and previ-
2. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 121, par. 3.
3. In fact, if a "rock" is only a low-tide elevation, it will not even have a ter-
ritorial sea. To generate a territorial sea, an island must be formed naturally and
must emerge from the sea at high tide. See DEREK W. BoWETr, THE LEGAL
REGIME OF ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1979) (defining "island" for the
purpose of generating a territorial sea). In other words, a high-tide elevation may
be a "rock" for purposes of exclusive economic zone ("EEZ") and continental
shelf rights, but an island for purposes of the territorial sea.
4. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, arts. 55, 57 (stating that the
EEZ is an area outside the territorial sea, and extends up to 200 miles from the
baseline of the territorial sea).
5. UNCLOS III defines the limit of the continental shelf as the 'outer edge
of the continental margin, ... or a distance of 200 nautical miles from the base-
lines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured," whichever is
further seaward. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 76, para. 1.
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ously unexplored question about Article 121(3) of UNCLOS III-
whether measures primarily intended to protect the marine envi-
ronment by establishing marine preserves around rocks but which
also have positive economic effects satisfy the "economic life of
their own" requirement. The manner in which Article 121(3) ulti-
mately is construed will affect thousands of small islands with sig-
nificant consequences for the maritime boundaries of coastal and
island States. Furthermore, it will reveal much about UNCLOS
III's ability to protect the marine environment and the international
legal status of marine environmental protection.
This Article argues that marine preserves can have an "economic
life of their own" within the meaning of Article 121(3) when a
State uses them both to protect the marine environment and to gain
a net economic benefit. Part I of this Article discusses the status of
islands under international law prior to and following the Third
Law of the Sea Convention. In addition, Part I demonstrates why,
under prevailing canons of treaty interpretation as well as from the
standpoint of public policy, Article 121(3) should be interpreted,
where possible, to foster economic development that protects the
environment in a sustainable manner.
Part II highlights the important place of marine environmental
protection in the Third UNCLOS. Furthermore, Part II describes
the development of international environmental law and the con-
cept of sustainable development since the signing of UNCLOS III.
Next, Part III provides an overview of methods applied to value the
environment and their normative implications. The discussion then
focuses on studies generally demonstrating the economic value of
the environment, particularly of the marine environment. Finally,
Part IV discusses the practical use of the proposed interpretation of
Article 121(3) and how potential problems in its application may be
overcome.
6. Article 121(3)'s other prong, which sets forth the "human habitation" re-
quirement, provides an alternative and independent basis of attaining the legal
status of an island, and is therefore not addressed in this Article. See Law of the
Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 121(3).
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I. ARTICLE 121(3) AND THE TREATMENT OF
ISLANDS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. ISLANDS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
BEFORE THE THIRD UNCLOS
Prior to the development of the territorial sea doctrine and sover-
eign rights over the continental shelf, there was no perceived need
to define the geographical concept of an "island" in international
legal terms.7 By the late nineteenth century, however, disputes over
fishery jurisdiction triggered a debate over whether the exclusive
rights of a State within a three-mile zone of its shores also should
apply to its "dependent islands and banks." State practice of mari-
time nations in the nineteenth century increasingly demonstrated
"the approximation in status of the territorial waters of even small
and uninhabited insular features to those of the mainland and conti-
nental features." 9
This practice continued through most of the twentieth century.
The First United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea at Ge-
neva in 1958 ("First UNCLOS")'0 recognized the prevailing as-
sumption that in creating maritime zones there was no substantive
difference between continental and all other types of insular forma-
tions. Aside from the unresolved issue involving the impact of is-
7. See CLIVE RALPH SYMMONs, THE MARITIME ZONES OF ISLANDS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1979) (explaining that during the nineteenth century, the
concept of "territorial seas" still was developing, and the concept of sovereign
rights on a continental shelf had not yet developed).
8. See id. at 2-3 (describing how fishery jurisdiction disputes arose off the
east coast of America and in the West Indies during the latter half of the nine-
teenth century).
9. Id. at 3.
10. The first United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea convened in
1958 in Geneva, Switzerland. This Convention resulted in the following four
conventions: (i) the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone;
(ii) the Convention on the High Seas; (iii) the Convention on Fishing and Con-
servation of the Living Resources of the High Seas; and (iv) the Convention on
the Continental Shelf ("1958 Conventions").
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lands on the median line or the equidistance rule" in the delimita-
tion of the continental shelves of opposite or adjacent States,'2 the
maritime zones of islands-except for Archipelagos-were not
thought to present any particular difficulties. Article 10(2) of the
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone states
that "[t]he territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive eco-
nomic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to
other land territory."' 4 Indeed, at the First UNCLOS in 1958, some
States urged that, where vital economic interests of the coastal
population are at stake, islands should be treated even more gener-
ously than continents with respect to claims to maritime zones."
In short, prior to the Third UNCLOS, international practice was
unambiguous in placing islands and the mainlands "on the same
footing in attributing to the State sovereign over each single island
the surrounding territorial waters and relative continental shelf."' 6
11. The rule, in its present form, provides in relevant part that:
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, nei-
ther of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the
contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of
which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured ....
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note I, art. 15.
12. See generally SHAW, supra note 1, at 436-44 (noting the considerable de-
bate over delimitation of continental shelves as well as the general principle that
such disputes be settled by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, as
set forth by the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") in the North Sea Continen-
tal Shelf and Anglo-French Continental Shelf cases).
13. See SYMMONS, supra note 7, at 4 (describing the assumption, borne out
by the First UNCLOS at Geneva in 1958, that no substantive difference exists
between continental and other types of insular territories in generating maritime
zones).
14. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, art. 10(2), Apr.
29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (1958) [hereinafter Convention on
the Territorial Sea].
15. See SYMMONS, supra note 7, at 4 (quoting the comments of Denmark as
expressed at the First UNCLOS).
16. Maria Silvana Fusillo, The Legal Regime of Uninhabited "Rocks " Lack-
ingAn Economic Life of Their Own, in IV THE ITAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 47 (1978-79);
see also id. at 57 (expressing that the only case known of an island's being de-
nied its right to an exclusive jurisdiction area of its own is that of the small unin-
[15:583
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Neither the size nor economic utility of an island was relevant in
determining its effect on a State's maritime jurisdiction. Even small
and barren rocks met the definition of an island, entitling them to
their own territorial sea and continental shelf. " UNCLOS III, how-
ever, brought both continuity and significant change to the interna-
tional regime of islands.
B. ARTICLE 121 AND THE STATUS OF ISLANDS
AFTER UNCLOS III
1. Origins ofArticle 121(3)
In two respects, the treatment of islands under Article 121 of the
Third UNCLOS is consistent with their treatment under the 1958
Conventions. Article 121(1) repeats verbatim Article 10 of the 1958
Convention on the Territorial Sea, which excludes artificial islands
and low-tide elevations from island status and thus prevents them
from obtaining a territorial sea of their own."' Similarly, Article
121(2) affirms that the maritime zones of islands are to be deter-
mined according to the Convention and in a manner similar to that
of other land territory.' 9
Article 121(3), however, marks an important break with the pre-
vious international regime of islands. This provision provides that
"[flocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of
their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf."' Article 121(3)'s distinction between "islands" and "rocks"
may be traced to the concern of some States that islets or small un-
habited islets of Rockall, in the Atlantic Ocean).
17. See E.D. Brown, Rockall and the Limits of National Jurisdiction of the
U.., 1 MARINE POL'Y 181, 205 (1978).
18. See Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 14, art. 10( 1) (explain-
ing that an island is a naturally formed area of land surrounded by water and is
above water at high tide).
19. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 121, para. 2 ("Except as
provided [in paragraph three governing "rocks"], the territorial sea, the contigu-
ous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are
determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicatle to
other land territory.").
20. Id. art. 121, para. 3.
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inhabited islands located outside the territorial sea would be used in
delimiting ocean space between neighboring States.2 Islands that
receive an EEZ or a continental shelf can extend a State's maritime
jurisdiction for up to 200 miles, whereas rocks, which receive only
a territorial sea, can extend a State's jurisdiction for only up to
twelve miles.22
This distinction between islands and rocks begs the following
question: what are these "second-class islands?"2 The 1958 Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea defines an island as "a naturally-
formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at
high-tide. 24 This definition excludes both artificial islands and
rocks that remain dry at low tide, "even if they seat lighthouses or
other permanently visible installations., 25 The preparatory works of
the Conference suggest that the "rocks" referred to in Article
121(3) should be considered small-sized islands." Proposed guide-
lines based on size,27 however, were never adopted, and the text of
21. See generally 3 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
1982: A COMMENTARY 330 (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne eds., 1995)
[hereinafter A COMMENTARY] (detailing the proposals submitted by various
states concerning the language to be used by the Convention in defining islands,
islets, and other similar geographic features as well as in the delimitation of
maritime spaces surrounding these land areas).
22. Article 121(3) appears to have been adapted from the proposal of Roma-
nia regarding islets and similar features. See id. at 335 (attributing the language
of paragraph three to the Romanian proposal). Islands "[also] may be used in
drawing the baseline from which other maritime zones are measured." Id. at 338.
23. See Fusillo, supra note 16, at 49 (posing the same question in reference to
Article 121(3)'s express rejection of the traditional equation of islands with the
mainland in favor of a distinction between islands with the same legal standing
as the mainland and "rocks," which are solely entitled to territorial waters).
24. Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 14, art. 10(1).
25. Fusillo, supra note 16, at 50. The distinction between islands and low-tide
elevations, however, is only relevant beyond the limits of the territorial sea since
a coastal state may utilize such elevations to draw its baselines, likening them to
islands. See id. (explaining the distinction between islands and semi-submerged
rocks).
26. See A COMMENTARY, supra note 21, at 51 (citing the 1974 Informal
Text).
27. See id. at 328 (describing the proposal of Malta at the 1973 session of the
Sea-Bed Committee). Those who opposed this change argued that basing the le-
gal definition of islands on size, or other criteria such as location or population,
590 [15:583
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Article 121(3) neither explicitly mentions size nor provides any
guidelines to that effect. The only explicit means that Article
121(3) provides for differentiating islands from rocks is the criteria
of "human habitation" and/or "economic life of their own." How-
ever, these criteria-which may possibly have been meant to limit
the "distorting effect" in maritime delimitation between States2'-
were never defined but rather remained ambiguous so as to be inof-
fensive to all States.29 How "economic life" ultimately is interpreted
will reveal much about the Convention's potential to protect the
marine environment and to advance emerging, less orthodox con-
cepts of economic utility rooted in environmental economics.
2. hIterpreting Article 121(3)
Article 121(3)'s ambiguity has led to several interpretations by
commentators. Some commentators propose that a definition of
"rocks" based on size should inform any interpretation of Article
121(3),3o and essentially avoid discussion of the meaning of "eco-
nomic life." Others argue that the interpretation of Article 121(3)
should be "in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.' According to the latter interpretation, UNCLOS III
was prompted by the expansive claims of coastal States in Latin
America over their coastal waters, but ultimately coalesced around
"jeopardiz[ed] the principles of sovereign equality and the integrity of territorial
sovereignty." Id. at 329 (quoting the representative of Greece in Sub-Committee
II).
28. See id. at 330 (highlighting the effect on delimitation of maritime spaces
brought about by the existence of islands and the status given to them).
29. See Jon M. Van Dyke & Robert A. Brooks, Uninhabited Islands: Their
Impact on the Ownership of the Oceans' Resources, 12 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.
265, 282 (1983) (blaming the ambiguity and brevity of the provisions on at-
tempts by the drafting committee to formulate articles that would respect areas of
consensus without prejudicing the position of any delegation).
30. See, e.g., R.D. Hodgson, Islands: Nornal and Special Circumstances, in
LAW OF THE SEA: THE EMERGING REGIME OF THE OCEANS 137, 150-51 (J. Gam-
ble ed., 1973) (explaining how islands may be classified as rocks less than .001
square mile in area, small in size, and unfit for human habitation).
31. See, e.g., Van Dyke & Brooks, supra note 29, at 285-86 (quoting the Vi-
enna Convention on Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 25 1.L.M. 543
(1986)).
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a series of compromises. The central goal of UNCLOS III is to
"retain a substantial portion of the oceans as the 'common heritage'
of humankind."33 Construed in this light, the test under Article
121(3) becomes a functional one, asking whether an island can
support a stable population,34 extract enough of its owner's re-
sources, 35 or a combination of the two.
Interpreting Article 121(3) in light of the Convention's overall
objectives and aims does not, however, inexorably yield to such a• 36 exlsv
conclusion. An exclusive focus on the goal of preserving the
ocean as the "common heritage of mankind" obscures the Conven-
tion's emphasis on protecting and preserving the marine environ-
ment." UNCLOS III is recognized as "the most comprehensive and
progressive international environmental law of any modem inter-
national agreement."38 Construing Article 121(3) in light not only of
the Convention's environmental objectives but also the principle of
32. See id. at 286 (stating that the compromises do not apply to remote unin-
habited islands that are claimed by distant nations). These commentators claim
that such compromises do not serve the central purposes of the Treaty to "grant
ocean space to barren atolls that have only slight links to some distant nation."
Id.
33. Id. at 288. Whether the final treaty achieved this goal is less certain. See
id. at 266 (stating while the negotiations for UNCLOS III "began idealistically
under the theme that the wealth of the oceans was the 'common heritage' of hu-
mankind[,] .... the treaty that has emerged gives the vast majority of these re-
sources to the nearest coastal nations" at the expense of that "common heritage").
Id. at 266.
34. See id. at 286 (describing the authors' proposal); see Fusillo, supra note
16, at 53-54 ("Insofar as Art. 121 para 3 of said Convention aims at curtailing
States' expansionist claims, it justifies such claims only in the event of there be-
ing a coastal community on the island.").
35. See Van Dyke & Brooks, supra note 29, at 285 (describing the views of
Northcutt Ely and Ambassador Prado).
36. See id. at 285-88 (providing an alternative interpretation of Article
121(3)).
37. See id. at 288 (stating that Article 121 should be interpreted to "grant an
exclusive economic zone and a continental shelf only to those islands that can
truly sustain 'stable' communities of organized groups of human beings").
38. See Jonathan I. Charney, The Marine Environment and the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 28 INT'L LAW. 879, 882 (1994) (stat-
ing that the Convention successfully addresses marine environment issues and is
a prototype for environmental agreements in other fields).
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maximum effectiveness,9 implies that "economic life of their own"
should include, where possible, policies that advance both marine
environmental protection and economic development.
Additionally, other canons of interpretation suggest that Article
121(3) should be construed in light of subsequent developments in
international lawo and, arguably, the overall "aims" and "objects"
of the Convention itself.41 Indeed, the Convention itself explicitly
dictates reference to other rules of international law when inter-
preting its provisions. Article 293 of the Convention states that "[a]
court or tribunal having jurisdiction under [UNCLOS III] shall ap-
ply this Convention and other rules of international law not incom-
patible with this Convention,"42 while the preamble provides that
39. Under the "principle of maximum effectiveness," the text should be con-
strued to have its fullest value and effect plausibly consistent with its wording.
See Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 480
(3d ed. 1993). It follows that if a text may be interpreted in two ways, both con-
sistent with its wording, the interpretation that fulfills both, and not merely one,
of the text's purposes should be adopted.
40. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and Inter-
national Organizations or Between International Organizations, art. 31(3)(a)-(b),
Mar. 21, 1985, 25 I.L.M. 543 (1986) ("There shall be taken into account, to-
gether with the context... any subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpreta-
tion... [and] any relevant rules of international law applicable in relations be-
tween the parties."); HENKIN ET AL., supra note 39, at 477 (describing the use of
"subsequent agreements, subsequent practice, and relevant rules of international
law"); see also id. at 479 (noting that United States courts have often relied on
subsequent conduct as evidence of intent where provisions were ambiguous).
41. See generally G.G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Points, BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 1-62 (1951) (describing the teleological approach to interpreting
treaties). This approach examines "the general purpose, and construe[s] the par-
ticular clauses in light of it," focusing on "the general tenor and atmosphere of
the treaty, the circumstances in which it was made, the place it has come to huve
in international law." See id. (emphasis added); see also HENKIN ET AL., supra
note 39, at 478 (arguing that it is not necessary to resort to extrinsic sources, such
as preparatory works, where the text is sufficiently clear). Strict textual ap-
proaches are not binding where, as in the case of Article 121(3), the text is am-
biguous. See id. Furthermore, the teleological, or "aims and objects" approach, is
most applicable in the sphere of general multilateral conventions of social, hu-
manitarian, and law-making type, such as the Third UNCLOS. See Fitzmaurice,
supra, at 2.
42. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 293 (stating the appli-
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"matters not regulated by th[e] Convention continue to be governed
by the rules and principles of general international law."'3 Further-
more, the Convention requires State cooperation on a global and,
where appropriate, regional basis, "to formulate and elaborate in-
ternational rules, standards, and practices to protect and preserve
the marine environment." 4 The Convention thus incorporates by
reference the more detailed international rules and standards estab-
lished in other global and regional agreements. 5 Since UNCLOS III
was signed and opened for ratification in 1982, numerous other
treaties that seek to protect and promote the environment have been
signed.' To the extent they are consistent with UNCLOS III, these
treaties constitute an "integral and necessary part of UNCLOS III's
environmental umbrella,' '47 and should influence any interpretation
of it.
Finally, important policy objectives bear on the interpretation of
Article 121(3).48 UNCLOS III's attempt to protect the marine envi-
ronment is undercut when any State is encouraged to select a par-
ticular development program that brings economic gain at the ex-
pense of the environment in instances where that State could have
chosen another measure that creates economic gain without harm-
ing the environment. Those developing countries facing internal
cable law); see also id. art. 311, para. 2 ("This Convention shall not alter the
rights and obligations of States Parties which arise from other agreements com-
patible with this Convention and which do not affect the enjoyment by other
States Parties of their rights or the performance of their obligations under this
Convention").
43. See id. preamble.
44. See id. art. 197 (stating that cooperation should be on a global and re-
gional basis).
45. See Lee A. Kimball, Symposium, The Law of the Sea Convention and
Marine Environmental Protection, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 745, 747 (1995)
(explaining that the standards include "doing environmental impact assessments
and monitoring and notification of marine pollution emergencies").
46. See infra Part II.B.I.
47. Lakshman D. Guruswamy, Should UNCLOS or GATT/WTO Decide
Trade and Environment Disputes?, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 287, 292-93
(1998) (finding that Article 197 is an example of how UNCLOS III is intertwin-
ing with other existing treaties).
48. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 121 (detailing the re-
gime of islands).
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pressure to sacrifice environmental protection for development are
further hindered by an interpretation of Article 121(3) that narrowly
defines "economic life of their own" in terms of short-term prof-
its.49 Therefore, general canons of construction, specific provisions
of UNCLOS III, and overall policy objectives all dictate that sub-
sequent agreements, to the extent that they do not conflict with the
Convention, should inform an interpretation of UNCLOS III's
more ambiguous provisions, such as Article 121(3).
II. UNCLOS IlH AND THE PROTECTION OF THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT
The Law of the Sea Convention represents an important devel-
opment in the environmental law of the sea." Negotiations for the
Convention began at the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea in 1972, the same year in which the Stockholm
Conference on the Human Environment was held.5' As the first
United Nations conference to address environmental issues,": the
Stockholm Conference considered many global environment prob-
lems. Although the Stockholm Conference ultimately opted for a
non-binding declaration of principles, the Stockholm Declaration,
particularly Principle 121's establishment of State responsibility for
transboundary international harm, is generally regarded as custom-
ary international law. 3 The Conference's results were immediately
49. See id. art. 121(3).
50. See Moira L. McConnell & Edgar Gold, The Modern Law of the Sea:
Frameivork for the Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, 23
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 83, 99 (1991) (stating that the "history of the modem
law of the sea also reflects, to a great extent, the development of the environ-
mental law of the sea"); see also Rachel Zajacek, The Development of Measures
to Protect the Marine Environment from Land-based Pollution: The Effective-
ness of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority in Managing the Effects of
Tourism on the Marine Environment, 3 JCULR 64, 65 (1996) (stressing that that
the health of the sea is critical to the health of the earth).
51. See Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf 48/PC 13, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1971) [herein-
after Stockholm Declaration] (outlining the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment held in Stockholm).
52. See Zajacek, supra note 50, at 71.
53. See Marc Pallemaerts, International Environmental Law from Stockholm
to Rio: Back to the Future?, in GREENING INT'L L. 1-19, at 2-5 (Philippe Sands
2000] 595
AM. U. INT' L. REV.
placed before the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea when it met in 1971, assuring the Conference's focus on
environmental issues.
5 4
In the end, UNCLOS III went beyond the Stockholm Conference
by providing a comprehensive framework for protecting and pre-
serving the marine environment. Its environmental focus, evident in
numerous provisions and in the treaty's overall structure, supports
an interpretation of Article 121(3) that simultaneously protects the
environment and brings an economic benefit to the nations or peo-
ple involved.
A. THE ENVIRONMENTAL PURPOSE OF THE THIRD UNCLOS
1. Requiring States to Protect the Marine Environment
Among the primary objectives of the 1982 Convention is the
"study, protection and preservation of the marine environment.""
The Convention contains the "highest-level global directives for the
protection and preservation of the marine environment presently
available. 56 In addition, it provides "the first comprehensive state-
ed., 1993) (describing the legal significance of the Stockholm Declaration).
54. See Charney, supra note 38, at 883 (finding that the marine environment
was already the subject of particular concern, as expressed by the establishment
of several conventions in the early 1970s). These conventions included the Con-
vention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Flabi-
tat, Feb. 2, 1971, 11 I.L.M. 969 (1972) [hereinafter Ramsar Convention] and the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO")
Convention for Protection of the World Cultural and National Heritage, Nov. 23,
1972, 27 U.S.T. 37 [hereinafter World Heritage Convention]. The United Na-
tions Environmental Program ("UNEP") established its Regional Seas Program
to address problems on a regional basis through the creation of Action Plans with
particular emphasis on the protection of marine living resources from pollution
and overexploitation. See GRAEME KELLEHER & RICHARD KENCHINGTON,
GUIDELINES FOR ESTABLISHING MARINE PROTECTED AREAS (1991) (describing
ways to help nations and states establish national representative systems of ma-
rine protected areas).
55. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.
56. See McConnell & Gold, supra note 50, at 83 (explaining that these pro-
tections are intrinsically part of international environmental law); see also Martin
H. Belsky, The Ecosystem Model Mandate for a Comprehensive United States
Ocean Policy and Laiv of the Sea, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 417, 461 (1989) (not-
ing that UNCLOS III provides "[p]erhaps... the strongest support for a new in-
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ment of international law on the issue.., a movement toward
regulation based upon a more holistic conception of the ocean as a
resource that is exhaustible and finite, and ocean usage as a re-
source management question." The international legal obligation,
set forth largely in Part XII of the Convention, has become part of
customary international lawi5
Furthermore, the Third UNCLOS creates a binding system of
obligations and dispute resolutions, which confers on a forum in-
ternational jurisdiction, authority, and implementing powers that
exceed those of other international environmental law forums and
rival those conferred on the World Trade Organization by the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariff and Trade in the area of trade and envi-
ronental disputes. The International Court of Justice ("IC") also
may apply UNCLOS III's rules to cases involving a nonsignatory
on the ground that the Convention encapsulates customary interna-
tional law, assuming of course that both States have consented to
the ICJ's jurisdiction.6
The Articles of UNCLOS III dealing with the marine environ-
ment are primarily contained in Part XII, which includes Articles
192 through 237 and which is divided into eleven sections." In ad-
ternational law mandate and of comprehensive ocean ecosystem management").
57. See McConnell & Gold, supra note 50, at 84-85 (explaining that one
State's use or abuse of resources negatively affects another State's use of re-
sources).
58. See id. at 85; Belsky, supra note 56, at 463-64 (provisions of UNCLOS
IU calling for ecosystem management represent new "'state practice" and thus are
binding law); McConnell & Gold, supra note 50, at 89 (arguing that the Conven-
tion's use of the terms "duty" and "obligation" underscores that States acting in
violation of articles 192 and 193 will be in breach of international law); see also
Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary of the Gulf of
Maine (Canada v. United States), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12) (commenting that the
Convention's provisions relating to the EEZ and continental shelf "were adopted
without any objections," and thus "may be regarded as consonant at present with
general international law").
59. See Guruswamy, supra note 47, at 288-89 (explaining the powers of the
United Nations Convention on the laws of the sea).
60. See id. (stating that the ICJ might be in a "position to adjudicate trade and
environmental disputes").
61. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1. pt. XII, sec. I (general provi-
sions); id. sec. 2 (global and regional cooperation); id. sec. 3 (technical assistance
and preferential treatment for developing States); id. sec. 4 (monitoring and envi-
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dition to establishing a wide range of obligations, Part XII provides
a comprehensive system for enforcing those obligations. 2 Individ-
ual States may exceed the minimum standards set forth in the Con-
vention so long as such additional standards would not unreasona-
bly interfere with other legitimate maritime interests. 63
Article 192 sets forth the central obligation of States with respect
to the marine environment: "[s]tates have the obligation to protect
and preserve the marine environment." While Article 193 ac-
knowledges the "sovereign right [of States] to exploit their natural
resources pursuant to their environmental policies," it subjects this
right to States' "duty to protect and preserve the marine environ-
ment."65 Articles 192 and 193 are not only binding on the States
party to the 1982 Convention 66 but are also generally considered
statements of customary international law, and, therefore, binding
67on all States.
The scope of a State's duty to the marine environment turns in
part on the definition of marine pollution provided in the Conven-
tion's first Article:
ronmental assessment); id. sec. 5 (adoption of necessary rules and regulations by
national states to address pollution from various sources); id. sec. 6 (enforce-
ment); id. sec. 7 (safeguards for States); id. sec. 8 (ice-covered areas); id. sec. 9
(responsibility and liability); id. sec. 10 (sovereign immunity); id. sec. II (obli-
gations under other international agreements).
62. Enforcement is detailed in Section Six, which includes articles 213 to
222. These articles are the "strongest of any multilateral environmental treaty to
date." Chamey, supra note 38, at 737. Strict enforcement measures are, none-
theless, balanced against the interests of States in freedom of navigation. Coln-
pare Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 218 (authorizing enforcement
action by a coastal State with a foreign vessel in its port against that vessel pro-
vided that the foreign vessel has been accused of illegally polluting the high seas
or waters within the jurisdiction of another coastal state), with id. art. 220(1)
(varying the unilateral enforcement power of a coastal State based upon the de-
gree of actual or potential environmental damage and the distance from the
shore). See id. at pt. XII, sec. 6 (detailing enforcement).
63. See Charney, supra note 38, at 889.
64. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 193.
65. Id. art. 193.
66. See id. art. 235(1) ("States are responsible for the fulfillment of their in-
ternational obligations concerning the protection and preservation of the marine
environment. They shall be liable in accordance with international law").
67. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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[T]he introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or en-
ergy into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or
is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to the living re-
sources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine
activities, including fishing and other legitimate use of the sea, impair-
ment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities.'
Article 194 reinforces this broad definition of marine pollution:
States shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures
consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce,
and control pollution of the marine environment from any source, using
for this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and in ac-
cordance with their capabilities, and they shall endeavor to harmonize
their policies in this connection.9
Such sweeping language also is used in Article 126, which extends
States' obligations to pollution arising from the use of new tech-
nologies.0 In addition to focusing on the source of pollution, the
Convention examines the effects of pollution, emphasizing the need
to "protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems, as well as the
habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other
forms of marine life."
68. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(4) (emphasis added). The
Convention's first Article also positively defines "dumping" in the following two
provisions: id. art. 1(5)(a)(i) ("Any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter
from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea."); and id.
art. 1(5)(a)(ii) ("any deliberate disposal of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other
man-made structures at sea."). The Convention's definition of marine pollution,
which includes harm to water quality and fisheries, broadened the previous defi-
nition provided in the 1974 Paris Convention. See Zajacek, supra note 50, at 74.
69. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 194(1). Article 194 also
addresses the risk of externalities, requiring States to "take all measures neces-
sary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted
as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their environment....
Id. art. 194(2).
70. See id. art. 196 ("States shall take all measures necessary to prevent, re-
duce and control pollution of the marine environment resulting from the use of
technologies under their jurisdiction or control ... ").
71. Id. art. 194(5). The International Maritime Organization ("IMO") has
designated certain areas as "particularly sensitive areas" that "need special pro-
tection ... because of their significance for recognized ecological or socio-
economic or scientific reasons and which may be vulnerable by maritime activi-
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The Convention places particular attention on the needs of de-
veloping States. It requires that States, directly or through compe-
tent international organizations, assist developing States to protect
and preserve the marine environment by promoting programs of
scientific, educational, technical, and other assistance,72 providing
appropriate assistance to minimize the damage caused by major en-
vironmental incidents,73 and helping prepare environmental assess-
ments. 4 Furthermore, the Convention provides that developing
States be granted preference by international organizations in "the
allocation of appropriate funds and technical assistance"*" and "the
utilization of their specialized services.7 6
2. Balancing Marine Environmental Protection and Economic
Development
Ironically, other parts of the Convention in which the primary
focus is not the protection of the marine environment further under-
score the link between environmental protection and economic de-
velopment. For example, Part V, which establishes the regime for
the EEZ, contains the articles that apply directly to the exploitation
of the living resources of the seas. The EEZ is a 200-mile area
wherein the coastal State has sovereign rights to explore and ex-
ploit, as well as to conserve and manage, marine resources." While
the Convention recognizes a coastal State's authority over the ex-
ploitation of living resources in its EEZ,8 it limits these EEZ rights,
requiring that State to "act in a manner compatible with the provi-
ties." Petter Ottesen et al., Shipping Threats and the Protection of the Great Bar-
rier Reef Marine Park-The Role of the Particularly Sensitive Sea Area Concept,
9 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 507, 519 (1994) (describing the protection
provided to Australia's Great Barrier Reef).
72. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 202(a).
73. Id. art. 202(b).
74. Id. art. 202(c).
75. Id. art. 203(a).
76. Id. art. 203(b).
77. Id. art. 56(1)(a). The provisions governing the EEZ are contained in Arti-
cles 55 through 75. The EEZ, including exclusive fishing rights within the zone,
is firmly established as a rule of customary international law. See Case Con-
cerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 33 (June 3).
78. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 56(1).
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sions of this Convention"79 (i.e., to protect and to preserve the ma-
rine environment).
While a coastal State "shall determine the allowable catch of the
living resources in its exclusive economic zone,"' that State "shall
ensure through proper conservation and management measures that
the maintenance of the living resources in the [EEZ] is not endan-
gered by over-exploitation."'" The Convention also requires that
coastal States design measures that "maintain or restore populations
of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum
sustainable yield."82 In addition, the Convention directs coastal
States to "promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living
resources in the EEZ without prejudice" to the above-mentioned
requirements."
The freedom of all States to fish on the high seas outside the
200-nautical mile limit is qualified not only by the obligation to re-
spect the interests of other States but also by the duty of conserva-
tion. States must determine the maximum allowable catch by cal-
culating the "maximum sustainable yield" M-a judgment to be
79. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 56(2). However, the Con-
vention's balance between a coastal State's right to protect its marine environ-
ment and a maritime State's right to freedom of navigation still weighs more
heavily in favor of the latter in the EEZ, as opposed to in the territorial sea. See
Daniel Bodansky, Protecting the Marine Environment from Vessel-Source Pol-
lution: UNCLOS III and Beyond, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 719, 767 (1991) (describing
how UNCLOS III's dispute resolution mechanism would help resolve disputes
between coastal and maritime States over vessel-source pollution).
80. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 6 1 (1).
81. Id. art. 61(2).
82. Id. art. 61(3). The Convention further states that the maximum sustain-
able yield is qualified by "relevant environmental and economic factors, includ-
ing the economic needs of coastal fishing communities and the special require-
ments of developing States... ." Id. Similarly, restrictions govern a State's
actions on the high seas. See id. art. 119(1 )(a) (requiring that States determine the
maximum allowable catch by calculating the maximum sustainable yield); see
also id. art. 119(l)(b) (requiring that States "take into consideration the effects on
species associated with or dependent upon harvested species with a view to
maintaining or restoring populations of such associated or dependent species
above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened").
83. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1. art. 62(1).
84. Id. art. 119(1)(a).
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based "upon the best available scientific evidence taking into con-
sideration a broad range of facts that look to the entire ecosystem,
as well as to relevant economic and management considerations.'"
Here, the Convention places particular attention on the damaging
effects of such fishing on the reproductive levels of species associ-
ated with, or dependent upon, harvested species. 6
These provisions, which restrict the actions of States both within
their respective jurisdictions and on the high seas, reflect UNCLOS
III's attempt to balance the protection of the marine environment
and the economic interests of States." The Convention not only
bolsters the preexisting principle of general international law that
States refrain from actions that cause damage to the environment of
the world's common spaces88 but also extends this principle to the
EEZ.
There is, however, an alternative reading of the Convention, one
which is suggested by its text and by subsequent developments in
international law. This interpretation rejects that environmental
protection and economic development are polar opposites or com-
peting values that necessarily require balancing, but rather views
them as complementary, mutually reinforcing goals.89 Indeed, envi-
85. Chamey, supra note 38, at 898. The Convention requires, however, that
"conservation measures and their implementation do not discriminate in form or
in fact against the fishermen of any State." Law of the Sea Convention, supra
note 1, art. 119(3).
86. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 119(l)(b) (recognizing
the need to maintain or restore such species to avoid threat against reproduction
levels).
87. The Preamble reflects this balance of interests, envisioning "a legal order
for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and
will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient
utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the
study, protection and preservation of the marine environment." Id. pmbl.
88. See Charney, supra note 38, at 898 (citing Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration for the proposition that "[s]tates have ... the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the envi-
ronment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction"').
89. See John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for
National Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 53 (1998) (suggesting that
environmental resources "be incorporated into economic values and allocated
efficiently").
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ronmental protection is increasingly discussed in terms of sustain-
able development, which may be defined as the maximization of
"the net benefits of economic development, subject to maintaining
the services and quality of natural resources over time."' While
sustainable development implicitly rejects putting a country's
short-term economic gain over the preservation of its natural re-
sources, it also recognizes that these resources must be given an
economic value.9 Such economic value may be quantified by the
techniques of environmental economics.
UNCLOS III supports the application of the principle of sustain-
able development to the marine environment. For example,
UNCLOS III enables States to apply conservation principles to
augment the availability and return from both renewable and non-
renewable marine resources through the creation of EEZs.' Simi-
larly, the Convention incorporates the principles of sustainable de-
velopment and the expanding field of environmental economics by
requiring that States conform their conduct to achieve the "maxi-
90. See DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 24 (1990); see also Richard Bilder, Intro-
duction, in THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LAW,
POLICY, AND SCIENCE 17 (Alastair Couper & Edgar Gold eds., 1993) [hereinafter
MARINE ENVIRONMENT] (defining sustainable development as "development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future gen-
erations to meet their own needs") (quoting WORLD COMMISSION ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987)). Sustain-
able development has come to dominate the environmental-economic debate. See
STEPHAN SCHMIDHEINY, CHANGING COURSE: A GLOBAL BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE
ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 5 (1992).
91. See Dembach, supra note 89, at 53 (suggesting that environmental pro-
tection measures that also have economic benefit should implemented because
"contribution of environmental economics to environmental protection is indis-
putable").
92. See id. at 53 (finding that environmental economics has been utilized to
analyze the "economic, environmental and social costs and benefits of environ-
mental and health" legislation, and of proposed projects such as hydroelectric
dams). See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1988) (discussing the growing field of environ-
mental law).
93. In practice, however, many, if not most, "marine resource exploitation
activities are undertaken without any real guarantee of sustainability." See Arthur
J. Hanson, Sustainable Development and the Oceans, in THE ROLE OF OCEANS IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 649 (Seoung-Young Hong et al. eds. 1993).
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mum sustainable yield ' 94 and the "optimum utilization" of marine
resources. 95 These principles counsel reading "economic of life of
their own" so as to encourage those environmental protection
measures that also have a demonstrable economic benefit. Subse-
quent developments in international law reinforce why Article
121(3), where possible, should be interpreted to support a marriage
between marine environmental protection and economic develop-
ment, rather than to treat the two as wholly irreconcilable goals.9 "
B. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
1. The Growth of International Environmental Law of the Sea
Subsequent agreements have both reaffirmed and expanded upon
UNCLOS III's regime for the marine environment." In June 1992,
on the twentieth anniversary of the Stockholm Convention," 170
countries met in Rio de Janeiro for the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development ("Rio Conference").9" The Rio
Conference, whose purpose was to shift the environment to the
center of the development process and economic policymaking de-
94. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
96. Cf Alicia Barcena, Some Reflections on a New Approach to Ocean and
Coastal Management, in MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 90, at 29 ("The
maintenance and proper valuation of marine and coastal environmental quality
and ecological integrity is a prerequisite for ensuring the provision of environ-
mental benefits, the sustainable use of renewable resources, and the provision of
the economic basis for a long-term and sustainable socio-economic develop-
ment.").
97. At the time of the Stockholm Convention in 1972, there were relatively
few international agreements concerning the environment. Since 1972, almost
every country has adopted at least one piece of environmental legislation, and
there are more than 870 legal instruments that contain at least some provisions
focusing on the environment. See Edith Brown Weiss, Introductory Note to
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, 31 I.L.M.
814 (1992).
98. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
99. See Weiss, supra note 97, at 814.
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cisions, ' ° resulted in a series of far-reaching, agenda-setting docu-
ments: Agenda 21, a complex 800-page document outlining actions
that must be taken in various sectors;"°' the Rio Declaration on En-
vironment and Development;'02 the Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change;' 3 the Convention on Biological Diversity;" and a
Statement of Principles on Forests.0 5
These agreements all contain provisions that seek to protect the
marine environment. Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, which is dedicated
to marine resources, acknowledges that UNCLOS III lays the foun-
dation for the environmental law of the sea.' Furthermore, Agenda
21 of the Rio Convention calls for the convening of a United Na-
tions intergovernmental conference to promote the implementation
of UNCLOS III's provisions on straddling fish stocks and highly
migratory fish stocks.' The resulting Agreement on Straddling
100. See Alicia Barcena, Some Reflections on a New. Aipproach to Ocean and
Coastal Management, in MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 90, at 21 (stating
that focusing on development does not detract from environmental issues be-
cause environmental protection is central to the development process).
101. See Agenda 21, United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (1992), reprinted in THE EARTH SUMMIT:
THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 125-
508 (Stanley P. Johnson ed., 1993).
102. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 l.L.M. 874
(1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. While such international declarations are
not binding on States, they nonetheless reflect a United Nations practice of for-
malizing significant principles and manifesting a commitment to creating basic
rules of international environmental law. See P.W. BIRNIE & A.E. BOYLE, BASIC
DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1 995).
103. See generally Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992,
31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter Climate Change Convention].
104. See generally Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 818.
105. See Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management,
Conservation, and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, June 13,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 881 [hereinafter Statement of Principles on Forests].
106. See AGENDA 21: THE EARTH SUMMIT STRATEGY TO SAVE OUR PLANET
156 (Daniel Sitarz ed., 1993) [hereinafter AGENDA 21] (asserting that the central
focus of UNCLOS III is preserving the vital biological diversity and ecological
integrity of marine ecosystems by setting forth the rights and obligations of na-
tions regarding the conservation and utilization of resources).
107. See LL.M. Background/Content Summan to UNITED NATIONS
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Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks contains numerous
provisions dedicated to protecting the marine environment.'08
Likewise, the Biological Diversity and Climate Change Conven-
tions seek to preserve the marine environment.' The Convention
on Biological Diversity attempts to "place marine biodiversity is-
sues, especially for rich ecosystems such as coral reefs, on the same
footing as more widely understood terrestrial problems.""0 The
Climate Change Convention includes an expanded understanding
of the critical role that the oceans play in creating and mediating
climate effects."' In addition, the 1985 Montreal Guidelines" 2 and
the 1995 Washington Declaration,"' which was adopted pursuant to
CONFERENCE ON STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH
STOCKS: AGREEMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA of December 10, 1982,
Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995) [hereinafter AGREEMENT
ON STRADDLING FISH STOCKS].
108. See, e.g., id. pmbl., 34 I.L.M. at 1548 (seeking to "avoid adverse impacts
on the marine environment, preserve biodiversity, maintain the integrity of ma-
rine ecosystems and minimize the risk of long-term or irreversible effects of
fishing operations").
109. In certain respects, the Third UNCLOS anticipated the Biological Diver-
sity and Climate Change conventions by recognizing the limitations of relying on
minimum standards for land-based sources. See Kimball, supra note 45, at 748.
110. Hanson, supra note 93, at 637. The Convention explicitly includes within
the definition of biological diversity the "marine and other aquatic ecosystems
and the ecological complexes of which they are part." Convention on Biological
Diversity, supra note 104, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 823. The Convention also states
that "[c]ontracting Parties shall implement th[e] Convention with respect to the
marine environment consistently with the rights and obligations of States under
the law of the sea." Id. art. 22, para. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 832.
11I. See Hanson, supra note 93, at 637; see also Climate Change Convention,
supra note 103, resolution, 31 I.L.M. at 851 (noting that the parties to the Con-
vention stated they were "[a]ware of the role and importance in terrestrial and
marine ecosystems of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases").
112. See Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine Environment
Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources, May 24, 1985, UNEP/GC.
13/9/Add.3, reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 77 (1985) [herein-
after Montreal Guidelines].
113. See Washington Declaration on Protection of the Marine Environment
from Land-Based Activities, adopted Nov. 1, 1995 in Washington, D.C., UNEP
(OCA)/LBA/IG.2/7 (last modified Oct. 13, 1996) [hereinafter Washington Dec-
laration].
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Agenda 21 of the Rio Conference,"" built on UNCLOS III by fur-
ther articulating standards to combat marine pollution from land-
based sources."
5
The Third UNCLOS also initiated efforts of international and
nongovernmental organizations to protect and preserve the marine
environment. In 1980, the World Wildlife Federation ("WWF"),
the United Nations Environmental Program ("UNEP"), and the In-
ternational Union for the Conservation of Nature and National Re-
sources ("IUNC") (now the World Conservation Union) published
the World Conservation Strategy, which emphasized the marine
environment's importance in providing for conservation and sus-
tainable development."16 In 1983, UNESCO organized the First
World Biosphere Reserve Congress, where nations recognized the
link between the concept of the biosphere reserve and the marine
environment."7 Finally, the Third Law of the Sea Convention pro-
vides the legal framework for the development of Marine and
Coastal Protected Areas ("MACPAs"), also known as Marine Pro-
tected Areas ("MPAs")."8 MACPAs are areas of the coastal zone or
open ocean that are made the target of management for the broad
purpose of conservation and sustainable use."" These post-
UNCLOS agreements and trends underscore why, as some com-
mentators have remarked, the "history of the modem law of the sea
also reflects, to a great extent, the development of the environ-
114. See Zajacek, supra note 50, at 78.
115. The 1974 conference in Paris on Marine Pollution from Land-based
Sources was the first convention to address specifically land-based marine pollu-
tion. See id. at 72. The Third UNCLOS established specific obligations with re-
spect to land-based sources. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, art.
207 (requiring States to adopt laws and regulations to "prevent, reduce and con-
trol pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources"). See gener-
ally Zajacek, supra note 50, at 67-70 (discussing land-based pollution).
116. See KELLEHER& KENCHINGTON, supra note 54, at 4.
117. See id.
118. Seeid. at3.
119. See W.M. Eichbaum et al., The Role of Marine and Coastal Protected
Areas in the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversitv, 9
OCEANOGRAPHY 60, 62 (1996); see also infra notes 208-211 and accompanying
text (discussing MACPAs).
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mental law of the sea."' 20
2. The Role of Sustainable Development in International Law
The numerous international agreements that embrace sustainable
development underscore that principle's increasing importance and
relevance to Article 121(3). Various parts of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development stress sustainable development.'
2'
Moreover, Agenda 21 represents a "plan of action" for sustainable
development by urging that "[t]he carrying capacity of the
Earth.. .be valued as an economic resource" and that environ-
mental protection "be intimately incorporated into the process of
resource development."'22 Likewise, the concept of sustainable de-
velopment pervades the Convention on Biological Diversity,'21 the
Framework Convention on Climate Change,' 2' and the Statement of
Principles on Forests.' 25 The concept is critical to the Agreement on
120. McConnell & Gold, supra note 50, at 99.
121. Sustainable development, the central principle of the declaration, is ex-
plicitly referred to in principles 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 20, 21, 22, 24, and 27. See Rio Dec-
laration, supra note 102, 31 I.L.M. at 877, 879-80. But see Pallemaerts, supra
note 53, at 16-18 (arguing that the original concept of sustainable development
had evolved prior to the Rio Conference to be defined as the subordination of the
environment to economic growth).
122. AGENDA 21, supra note 106, at 11.
123. See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 104, art. 6(a),
31 I.L.M. at 825 (requiring that parties "[d]evelop national strategies, plans or
programs for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity"); see
also id. art. 8(a), 31 I.L.M. at 825 (requiring parties to "[e]stablish a system of
protected areas or areas where special measures need to be taken to conserve
biological diversity").
124. See Climate Change Convention, supra note 103, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 854
(stating that the ultimate objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere is to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable
manner); id. art. 4, 31 I.L.M. at 855 ("The Parties have a right to, and should,
promote sustainable development.").
125. See Statement of Principles on Forests, supra note 105, pmbl. (c), 31
I.L.M. at 882.
Forestry issues and opportunities should be examined in a holistic and bal-
anced manner within the overall context of environment and development,
taking into consideration the multiple functions and uses of forests, includ-
ing traditional uses, and the likely economic and social stress when these
uses are constrained or restricted, as well as the potential for development
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Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, which
aims "to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. ' ' Indeed, a
basic goal of the Convention on Biological Diversity was to focus
attention on the great value of genetic resources in the environment
and to provide financial incentives to conserve them.'
The concept of sustainable development has received wide rec-
ognition from various other sources as well: the foundation docu-
ments of international organizations;2' the practices of international
financial institutions;' 29 regional declarations and planning docu-
ments; 30 ICJ decisions; 3 ' and State practice."2 Furthermore, sus-
that sustainable forest management can offer.
Id.
126. AGREEMENT ON STRADDLING FISH STOCKS, supra note 107, art. 2, 34
I.L.M. at 1549.
127. See Andrew Pollack, Biological Products Raise Questions of Genetic
Ownership, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1999, at A 1, C 12. "'If you can't get farmers to
recognize that there is a value in a forest other than for cattle, the outlook is
really very grim for the tropics."' Id. (quoting statement by Joshua P. Rosenthal,
biodiversity director at the Fogarty International Center of the National Institutes
of Health).
128. See, e.g., Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7,
at 93 n.11 (Sept. 25) (separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry) (citing
the foundation documents of The North American Free Trade Agreement, the
World Trade Organization, and the European Union).
129. See id. at 93 n.12 (noting that the World Bank Group, the Asian Devel-
opment Bank, the African Development Bank, the Inter-American Development
Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development all adhere to
the principle of sustainable development); SCHMIDHEINY, supra note 90, at 10-11
(noting the recognition by businesses that their long-term success depends on
whether they participate in solving sustainability issues).
130. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 93 n.13 (separate
opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry) (citing, for example, the Langkawi
Declaration on the Environment, which was adopted in 1989 by the "Heads of
Government of the Commonwealth representing a quarter of the world's popula-
tion," and which made sustainable development its main theme). Some action
plans directly relate to the marine and coastal environment. See id. (citing the
Action Plan for the Protection and Management of the Marine and Coastal Envi-
ronment of the South Asian Seas Region, 1983, para. 10, which discusses "'sus-
tainable, environmentally sound development").
131. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 89 (separate opinion
2000]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
tainable development underlies the growth of MACPAs, which
have become an increasingly important means of advancing the
protection of fragile marine ecosystems and biological diversity."'
Sustainable development arguably has replaced the freedom of the
seas, which had equated the right of any number of users to exploit
a given resource so long as some users comply with existing rules,
as the central paradigm for marine resources."'
Sustainable development particularly is critical in the developing
world, where a close dependence on natural resources and the fra-
gility of the interconnections between them highlights the economic
importance of resource management.'35 Because developing coun-
tries are situated at the "crossroads of social choices regarding eco-
nomic development, natural-resource use, and environmental qual-
of Vice-President Weeramantry) (noting that sustainable development has be-
come "an integral part of modem international law"). Justice Weeramantry
traced sustainable development's origins to several ancient civilizations, calling
it "one of the most ancient of ideas in the human heritage." Id. at 110. In a subse-
quent matter, the Court emphasized that:
the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the
quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations
unborn. The existence of the general obligation of states to ensure that ac-
tivities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other
States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of inter-
national law relating to the environment.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 241 (July 8).
132. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 93-94 n.14 (citing
the 1990 Dublin Declaration by the European Council on the Environmental Im-
perative, which urged the European Community and Member States to achieve
"long-term sustainable development"). The Dublin Declaration stated that reme-
dial measures must be taken to "ensure that [the] future economic development"
of Central and Eastern European states is "sustainable." See id.; see also Coastal
Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. sec. 1451(a) ("There is a national interest in
the effective management, beneficial use, protection, and development of the
coastal zone.").
133. See Eichbaum, supra note 119, at 60 (introducing the reader to the variety
of services provided by MACPAs, including public education, outreach, and the
maintenance of communications between law and policy). See also infra notes
208-211 and accompanying text (providing the historical developments and
benefits of MACPAs).
134. See Danny L. Elder, International Union for Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources, in MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 90, at 17.
135. See PEARCE & TURNER, supra note 90, at 349-50.
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ity management," they can avoid the costly mistakes often made in
industrialized countries and reduce the total costs of environmental
degradation by anticipatory rather than remedial polices."' In de-
veloping countries, current standards and norms should be taken
into consideration when evaluating the environmental risks not only
of new activities, but also of activities begun in the past.'"
In the context of Article 121(3), promoting sustainable develop-
ment means that a coastal State should not be penalized for taking
steps to protect the marine environment in a way that also enhances
economic value. If, for example, a State establishes a marine sanc-
tuary around a "rock" to protect a coral reef while also demon-
strating the economic value of maintaining the reef in a pristine
State, that "rock" should be considered to have an "economic life of
[its] own" within the meaning of Article 121(3), and should there-
fore be accorded island status. Consequently, that State should not
be penalized, but rather should receive the benefit of expanded
maritime jurisdiction, just as if it had pursued more "traditional"
avenues of economic development, such as exploiting the marine
resources around the "rock."
3. Article 121(3) and the "Tragedy of the Commons"
The interpretation of Article 121(3) presented here not only
raises questions about the traditional notion of the high seas as the
136. MAYNARD M. HUFSCHMIDT ET AL., ECONOMIC NATURAL SYSTEMS AND
DEVELOPMENT, AN ECONOMIC VALUATION GUIDE 5-6 (1983) (arguing that while
extensive developments in North America and Western Europe offer hope that
there can be equal progress in the developing world, the application of tech-
niques must take into account differences between the developed and developing
world, including differences in income level and types of economies).
137. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 78 (expressing the
Court's support for sustainable development as a means for reconciling economic
development and environmental protection).
Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing awareness of the risks for
mankind-for present and future generations-of pursuit of such interven-
tions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new norms and standards have
been developed, set forth in a great number of instruments during the last
two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into consideration, and such
new standards given proper weight, not only when States contemplate new
activities but also when continuing with activities begun in the past.
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common heritage of mankind but also offers a window into another
instance of the "tragedy of the commons." As one commentator has
noted:
Prior to this century, people correctly assumed that human beings could
not harm the oceans because they are so vast, and therefore that the
principle of freedom of the seas posed no danger to the continued avail-
ability of resources. This century has seen a dramatic increase in the
number of people exploiting the ocean and in the advancement of tech-
nologies to do so, rendering that assumption invalid. No longer, there-
fore, is the principle of freedom of the seas without environmental con-
sequences.
The plight of the oceans may be analogized to the grazing lands of
Garrett Hardin's seminal essay,9'3 whose overuse by herdsman,
each pursuing his own individual interest, brought ruin to this
common natural resource. 4 For a State today, the positive compo-
nent of developing additional areas of the world's oceans out-
weighs the negative component of overuse of this common re-
source because the former accrues only to the using State, whereas
the latter is shared by all States. Thus, with respect to the world's
oceans, a "tragedy of the commons" results when environmentally-
sensitive marine areas fall prey to the overuse, plunder, and/or de-
struction by governments or private interests.
138. See Danny L. Elder, International Union for Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources, in MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 90, at 57.
139. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243
(1968), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 132 (Bruce Ackerman et
al. eds., 1995) (arguing that economic ideas, such as Adam Smith's "invisible
hand," where individuals working to benefit themselves benefit the public as a
whole, have led to the ruin of common areas around the world). In fact, over-
fishing was the initial metaphor for the tragedy of the commons. See Carol Rose,
The Comedv of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Prop-
erty, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 747-48 (1986) (describing the difficulties stir-
rounding the conservation of fish under American public policy doctrine).
140. See Hardin, supra note 139, at 133, reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTY LAW 132 (Bruce Ackerman et al. eds., 1995) (describing how, once
social stability is reached and the populations of both herdsmen and cattle in-
crease, each herdsman will act rationally to increase his herd and, in the process,
deplete the commons of its resources). Hardin, an ecologist, urged international
cooperation to reduce world population growth, comparing environmental prob-
lems to the inevitable failure of peasants to prevent overgrazing on common
lands. See generally id.
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Here, the tragedy of the commons is not necessarily best averted
through "coercive" regulatory measures,'14 which may be difficult
to enforce under the current international legal regime,' " but rather
may more effectively be avoided through private ownership by a
single State. Such a State would henceforth be committed to pro-
tecting the marine preserve because of the economic value of the
preserve's resources and because of the incentive of expanded
maritime jurisdiction pursuant to Article 121(3). That State's own-
ership of the preserve would not, however, be absolute; rather the
State would hold the marine preserve as a "public trust" since its
rights would ultimately be subordinate to those of the public.'" Any
failure by that State to preserve the marine environment would lead
to a loss of its expanded maritime jurisdiction.
Article 121(3) thus exposes the possible flaws in a strict public-
private dichotomy, suggesting instead that the best method of pre-
serving the oceans may, in some instances, be to make small por-
tions of them private.' Ironically, therefore, the preservation of an
141. See id. at 137-39 (presenting the utility of the concept of mutual coercion
in protecting the commons). Hardin proposed -coercive" measures to avoid the
ruin resulting from "each pursuing his best interest in a society that believes in
the freedom of the commons." Id. Hardin's conclusion has, however, been chal-
lenged by studies resting on classical economic theory, which state that privati-
zation is the best away to avoid the "tragedy" he envisioned. See Rose, supra
note 139, at 712 (stating that since the 18th century, many individuals, including
proponents of neoclassical economies such as Richard Posner, have argued that
the world is best managed through private ownership).
142. Cf Michelle Cuttler, Note, hIcentives .for Reducing Oil Pollution from
Ships: The Case for Enhanced Port States Control, 8 GEO. INr'L ENvT-L. L. REV.
175, 190 (1995) (discussing various "preventive laws" governing vessel source
pollution). See generally W. Michael Reisman, Essay, Though or Despite Gov-
ernments: Differentiated Responsibilities in Human Rights Programs, 72 IOWA
L. REV. 391, 394 (1987) (stating that "[w]e have libraries full of international
law, but it is very difficult to implement or enforce it").
143. Cf Rose, supra note 139, at 714 (noting the acceptance of the view that
waterfront property is "inherently public" and that present owners hold it in trust
for the public who continue to have limited access to it).
144. The interpretation proposed in this Article borrows from, without wholly
endorsing, the neoclassical theory-espoused by Judge Richard Posner and oth-
ers-that property will be best used and conserved when divided among private
owners. See id. at 711-12. Here, the controlling State has the incentive of ex-
panded maritime jurisdiction to create and maintain a marine preserve. The
State's control, however, would not be absolute because it could not exploit the
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island as a privately controlled marine park under Article 121(3)
may be the most concrete manifestation of that particular area's
value as part of our common heritage of the high seas. Furthermore,
it provides an alternative to straightforward regulation, which, as
public choice theory has shown, may lead to the dominance of the
relevant regulatory agency by those very nations most eager to ex-
ploit the particular marine resource.'
The "economic life" criterion of Article 121(3) requires more,
however, than the mere assertion by a State that a particular envi-
ronmental protection measure advances economic development.
That State must also demonstrate that the economic benefit is real.
To this end, that State may rely on environmental economics,
which provides a means of quantifying the value of environmental
protection as well as its potential costs.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS,
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND ARTICLE
121(3)
A. DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
In the early stages of the "Environmental Revolution" of the late
1960s and early 1970s, many environmentalists viewed the use of
economic analysis in policymaking with suspicion. 46 Over the past
two decades, however, environmentalists have accepted a more
constructive role for the economic analysis of environmental prob-
lems. 47 Conversely, economists are increasingly recognizing the
natural resource as it wished, but would instead need to preserve it for future
generations. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the application of the principles of
the conservation easement to Article 121(3)).
145. See David A. Dana, Overcoming the Political Tragedy of the Commons:
Lessons fiom the Reauthorization of the Magnuson Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 833,
834 (1997) (discussing the "political tragedy of the commons" exposed by public
choice theory).
146. See THE ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT, at xiii (Wallace E. Oates ed.,
1992) (noting, for example, that the Clean Air Act of 1970 forbade the use of a
benefit-cost analysis in determining standards for environmental quality in the
United States).
147. See id. (discussing the various reasons for this shift in perspective, in-
cluding a lack of progress and a realization that past methods often were ineffec-
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need to incorporate externalities, like environmental impact, into
their economic analysis of development, "y particularly given the
failure of markets to reflect environmental degradation's true
cost.'49
Underlying the reconciliation between environmentalists and
economists is the concept that environmental protection and eco-
nomic development are not mutually exclusive but, at least in some
instances, are two sides of the same coin.
[E]xperience in both the developed and developing world demonstrates
that on many occasions economic development activities have not
shown sufficient concern for maintaining natural systems and environ-
mental quality. This is due in part to the view that economic growth and
environmental quality are alternatives-deterioration in environmental
quality is viewed as a necessary cost of rapid economic growth. This
view is misleading. Deforestation and the resulting soil erosion under-
mine the agricultural base of an economy and reduce long-term growth
prospects. Pollution of coastal waters can destroy commercial fisheries
and can also check economic growth. Air pollution affects human health
with a resultant loss in productive effort as well as direct welfare losses
to individuals .... For these reasons, it is of utmost importance that the
effects on natural systems of development projects and programs be
carefully analyzed. Such analysis is not a luxury, but must become an
tive).
148. See, e.g., Robert U. Ayres & Allen V. Kneese, Production, Consumption,
and Externalities, in THE ECONOMICs OF THE ENVIRONMENTr, supra note 146, at
282-83 (emphasizing the economic significance of externalities associated with
the disposal of residuals resulting from the consumption and production process
due to the varying ability of the ambient environment to receive and assimilate
them).
149. See, e.g., SCHMIDHEINY, supra note 90, at 15-16 (finding that markets
often fail to reflect the costs of environmental degradation because markets fail
to "integrate environmental costs into economic decisions"). Some economists
have rejected a single measure of economic growth, such as the Gross National
Product ("GNP"). See, e.g., Herman E. Daly, On Sustainable Development and
NationalAccounts, in ECONOMICS, GROWTH AND SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTS:
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF RICHARD LECOMBER 52-53 (David Collard et al. eds.,
1988) (rejecting the reliance on a single account of GNP in favor of reliance on a
benefit account, cost account, and capital account, which, collectively, more ac-
curately reflect the importance of sustainability); Daniel H. Cole, AccountingJbr
Sustainable Development, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 123, 123 (1996) ("The prob-
lem, simply put, is that GNP and other standard measures of economic produc-
tion fail to adequately reflect the actual economic-welfare impacts of environ-
mental policies.").
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essential part of project formulation and evaluation if protection is to be
provided to the natural-resource base that sustains human welfare....
[A] collection of already existing analytical approaches and techniques,
including benefit-cost analysis, can be used to incorporate environ-
mental quality concerns into the economic analysis of projects, pro-
grams, and development strategies.... Now the time has come to pull
the strands together and show how these techniques can assist in incor-
porating the dimension of environmental quality into development plan-
ning.1-0
The practical implications of this reconciliation are two-fold:
using the tools of economic analysis to achieve environmental
ends;'5 ' and incorporating environmental costs, particularly over the
long-term, into development planning.' Valuation methods devel-
oped by economists may thus be used to determine a development
project's cost to the environment or, conversely, to measure an en-
vironmental improvement's economic benefit, if any.
The development of these valuation methods has made possible
the application of cost-benefit analysis to decisions affecting the
environment. Cost-benefit analysis is a systematic method of iden-
150. HUFSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 136, at 1-2 (introducing the author's ar-
gument that analysis of the environmental impact of development plans is critical
for both the environment and human welfare).
151. See ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A RECONCILIATION, at vii
(Walter E. Block ed., 1990) ("By using such economic building blocks as free
market prices, private property rights, and, most important, a legal system that
carefully defines, delineates, and protects such rights, the goals of environmen-
talists can be achieved.").
152. See HUFSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 136, at 44 ("Incorporating the true
social costs of natural resource exploitation in development planning is one way
of ensuring that economically efficient resource allocation decisions will be
made."); THEODORE PANAYOTOU, GREEN MARKETS: THE ECONOMICS OF
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 26 (1993) (linking environmental degradation to
the "disassociation of scarcity and price, benefits and costs, rights and responsi-
bilities, actions and consequences"); see also id. at 5 (describing how the short-
term benefits of forest conversation obscure its long-term costs). Some have gone
further by pressing the view that environmental use is itself a prerequisite of a
"truly economic contribution." See Comment of Philom~ne A. Verlaan, Rocke-
feller Foundation, in THE ROLE OF THE OCEANS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY,
supra note 93, at 664 (arguing that nations should acknowledge the economic
costs of disregarding environmental factors in creating ocean development
plans).
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tifying and measuring the economic benefits and costs of a par-
ticular project or program.' In economic terms, a development
project is desirable only if total project benefits, including those
arising from any environmental improvement, exceed total project
costs, including those arising from any damage to the environ-
ment. " Likewise, an environmental improvement is only desirable
if its total benefits exceed its total costs, including the opportunity
cost or foregone income of a particular economic development.'"
Thus, cost-benefit analysis is central to sustainable development
because it incorporates the long- and short-term costs of develop-
ment to the environment. Similarly, it is the best way of quantifying
the economic value, if any, of a given environmental protection
measure. While some claim that risk to the environment cannot be
quantified, 5 6 others maintain that money remains the best indicator
of preference and measure of gains and losses in welfare, environ-
153. See HUFSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 136, at 2. Cost-benefit analysis,
which is rooted in neoclassical economic theory, is based on the concept of a
potential Pareto improvement: a change is economically desirable if the winners
can compensate the losers, that is, if benefits exceed costs, regardless of income
distribution. See id. at 25-26.
154. See id. at 49 (discussing the problem of how to incorporate environmental
costs and benefits in to project design); see also PANAYOTOU, supra note 152, at
151 (arguing that projects should be supported if they protect, restore, and en-
hance the environment, and are based on an extended economic analysis that
fully internalizes benefits as well as costs).
155. See HUFSCM11DT ET AL., supra note 136, at 191 (noting that the concept
underlying the opportunity cost approach is that the opportunity cost of unpriced
uses-for example, of preserving land for a national park instead of cutting down
the trees for timber-can be estimated from the foregone income from other
uses, such as agriculture or forestry). The opportunity cost approach thus meas-
ures the financial sacrifice, not benefits, of preservation, and is useful where such
benefits are difficult to estimate. See id. at 191-94 (describing the successful use
of the opportunity cost approach by environmental groups in New Zealand to
save indigenous forests from clear-cutting).
156. See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulator Costs of Mithic Proportions, 107 YALE
L.J. 1981, 2069 (1998) (arguing that attempts to find precise numbers in deter-
mining numbers of lives saved by regulation distorts the issue); see also Antonio
Herman Benjamin & Charles Weiss, Jr., Economic and Marker Incentives as In-
strunents of Environmental Policy in Brazil and the United States, 32 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 67, 72 (1997) (observing that Brazilian environmental law specialists de-
scribe the environment as a set of "values that cannot be measured economi-
cally").
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mental or otherwise. 157
Cost-benefit analysis has spawned a variety of methods and tax-
onomy that address the challenging task'"8 of placing a monetary
value on the environment. For example, environmental valuation
distinguishes "user" values, which derive from the actual use of the
environment, from "intrinsic" values, which are in the real nature of
the thing and unrelated to actual use. User values include not only
actual, present uses, but also potential uses, which are expressed in
terms of option values.'16 Intrinsic values, also called existence val-
ues, are difficult to define, but incorporate people's concern for,
sympathy with, and respect for the rights and welfare of non-human
beings.1
62
Environmental benefits may be assessed through direct (market)
or indirect (nonmarket) techniques.' Market value or productivity
approaches involve observing and measuring how changes in envi-
ronmental quality lead to changes in prices and levels of output. "
157. See PEARCE & TURNER, supra note 90, at 121 (explaining that money is a
means to measure gains or losses in utility on welfare, and not an objective).
158. See id. at 22 ("Economic research into monetary valuation of' environ-
mental commodities is still in a state of flux, although considerable progress has
been made."); see also Cole, supra note 149, at 127-28 (stating that economists
have been working since at least the mid-1940s to assess more accurately "the
real environmental costs of pollution and resource consumption and correspond-
ing benefits from pollution prevention and resource conservation").
159. See generally PEARCE & TURNER, supra note 90, at 129-58 (presenting
the taxonomy and formulas by which environmental economists measure and
evaluate environmental damage).
160. See id. at 129-30 (citing anglers and ornithologists, as well as those who
simply like to view the countryside, as examples of those who might derive "user
values" from a natural resource, such as a lake).
161. See id. at 130 (listing potential uses, or "option values," along with pres-
ent uses, as examples of user values); see also id. at 131 (distinguishing "bequest
values" from "existence values" ).
162. See id. at 130 (noting, for example, the intrinsic value of the remaining
stocks of certain whales).
163. See HUFSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 136, at 170-72 (listing various mar-
ket and non-market techniques for evaluating changes in environmental quality).
164. See id. at 172 (describing the authors' theoretical basis by characterizing
environmental quality as a factor of production in a traditional production/market
analysis).
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The increased productivity from a reduction in soil erosion or from
the increased quality of water used for irrigation are examples of
this approach. 165 In addition, direct valuation approaches attempt to
measure the monetary value of environmental gains, either by
looking for a surrogate market or by employing an "experimental
approach."' 66
The surrogate market approach looks for a market in which goods or
factors of production (especially labor services) are bought and sold,
and observes that environmental benefits or costs are frequently attrib-
utes of those goods or factors. Thus a fine view or the level of the air
quality is an attribute or feature of a house; risky environments may be
features of certain jobs, and so on. The experimental approach stimu-
lates a market by placing respondents in a position in which they can
express their hypothetical valuations of real improvements in specific
environments. In this second case, the aim is to make the hypothetical
valuation as real as possible.'6 7
The hedonistic price approach,' 6" contingent valuation method,"'
the travel cost approach,' 70 and the wage differential approach"' are
165. See id. at 172-73 (listing various examples of how changes in environ-
mental quality can lead to changes in productivity or productivity costs).
166. See PEARCE & TURNER, supra note 90, at 142 (noting that there are "di-
rect" and "indirect" approaches to the valuation of environmental benefits and
explaining the implications of each approach).
167. Id. at 142. A surrogate market approach might be employed where an en-
vironmental service is a perfect substitute for a private marketable good, for ex-
ample, private pools as substitutes for clean lakes or streams.
See HUFSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 136, at 195-96 (offering various examples of
environmental services that may substitute for private marketable goods). "If
such substitutions are made, then the benefit of an increase in the supply of an
environmental good, such as a [clean lake or stream], may be deduced from ob-
serving the reduction in the purchase of the private good [such as the private
pool]." Id. at 196.
168. See PEARCE & TURNER, supra note 90, at 143 (describing the "hedonic
approach" as one that identifies how much of a property value differential is at-
tributable to a particular environmental difference between properties, and then
infers how many people are willing to pay for an improvement in environmental
quality and the social value of that improvement).
169. See id. at 148 (defining "contingent valuation method" as "basically
ask[ing] people what they are willing to pay for a benefit, andlor what they are
willing to receive by way of compensation to tolerate a cost").
170. See id. at 152-56 (describing the "travel cost approach" as one that esti-
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all examples of the experimental approach. In contrast, indirect
valuation does not measure direct revealed preference for the envi-
ronmental good at issue. Rather indirect valuation calculates a
"dose-response" relationship between pollution and some effect,
and, only at that point, applies some measure for preferences for
that effect, such as the effect of pollution on health.'
Insofar as a cost-benefit calculation involves the environment in
a significant way, it should be made against the background norm
of the precautionary principle. This widely accepted principle'7'
holds that because environmental measures must anticipate the
causes of environmental degradation, lack of full scientific cer-
tainty does not provide a basis for postponing such measures where
there exists the risk of serious environmental damage.'7 4 In addition,
evidence suggests that where development is irreversible, as in the
frontier, because the optimal level of development will be less than
an analysis based on current valuations would indicate, such devel-
opment should cease when its marginal benefit exceeds that of
preservation. 
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mates the value of natural resources according to the value consumers place on
time, for example, by deriving a demand curve for a recreational site).
171. See HUFSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 136, at 213-14 (noting that under this
theory the price of wages would vary with respect to the working and living con-
ditions of an area, such as the "risk[s] to life and health and urban amenities or
disamenities").
172. See PEARCE & TURNER, supra note 90, at 142.
173. See SCHMIDHEINY, supra note 90, at 4-5 (noting that the precautionary
principle was embraced at the World Industry Conference on Environmental
Management in 1984, at the 1989 Paris Summit of the leaders of the G7, and in
the Ministerial Declaration of the 1990 U.N. Economic Commission for Europe);
see also AGREEMENT ON STRADDLING FISH STOCKS, supra note 107, art. 6, 34
I.L.M. at 1551 (outlining how States shall apply the precautionary approach to
guard marine life).
174. See SCHMIDHEINY, supra note 90, at 4-5; see also Zajacek, supra note 50,
at 82 (noting that Australia's establishment of the Great Barrier Reef Marine
Park of 1975, which was inspired by concerns about the potentially harmful ef-
fects of petroleum exploration and mining, was an early example of the applica-
tion of the precautionary principle).
175. See Scott Barrett, Optimal Economic Growth and the Conservation of
Biological Diversity, in ECONOMICS AND ECOLOGY: NEW FRONTIERS AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 130, 132 (Edward B. Barbier ed., 1993) (describ-
ing important lessons to be learned from an analysis of the economics of envi-
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In short, cost-benefit analysis has spawned various techniques to
make valuation of the environment feasible. These techniques make
it possible to determine whether an island has "an economic life of
[its] own" under Article 121(3). How these techniques have been
applied to the environment in the past provides insight into how
they may continue to be applied to the marine environment in the
future.
B. CASE STUDIES DEMONSTRATING THE ECONOMIC VALUE
OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Numerous studies demonstrate the economic value of preserving,
as opposed to exploiting, the environment. For example, a cost-
benefit analysis in Nepal demonstrated various economic gains of a
land management policy focused on soil conservation.' Another
study, aimed at reducing poaching, showed the opportunity cost, or
economic loss, associated with declines in elephant populations by
measuring the viewing value of elephants as expressed through
tourist spending.'" An experimental approach based on bidding
demonstrated the monetary value of a lake's aesthetic beauty, as
people were willing to pay more to prevent a power plant that re-
duced visibility than to prevent a power plant without reduced visi-
bility.
78
Case studies of wetlands powerfully show why in some instances
conservation, rather than development, is the most economically
ronmental preservation).
176. See HUFSCMIDT ET AL., supra note 136. at 175-79 (observing, inter alia,
the economic benefits of increased grass yield supporting more cows per acre, a
greater output of fuelwood and leaves that can be used as fodder, and a decrease
in the eutrophication rate of the lake that increases the life of the hydroelectric
power plant and lake fishery as well as the number of tourists to the area).
177. See Gardner Brown, Jr., The Viewing Value of Elephants, in ECONOMICS
AND ECOLOGY: NEW FRONTIERS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 146 (Edward
B. Barbier ed., 1993) (noting that viewing elephants creates two types of bene-
fits: tourist revenue and "consumers' surplus, meaning that [consumers]...
value their safari more than it costs"). This technique is known as the travel cost
approach. See supra note 170.
178. See HUFSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 136, at 23843 (illustrating how one
type of survey-based evaluation can be used to determine a value for unpriced
goods, such as an unobstructed view and clean air).
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beneficial option.' There is a "growing awareness that most wet-
lands are more valuable economic resources in their natural, or only
slightly modified state, than if radically altered and intensively
managed."'80 Among important wetland uses are life-supporting
services, pollution assimilation, the cycling of nutrients, and the
maintenance of the balance of gases in the air.' 8' Although indirect
and non-use values of wetlands have not yet been quantified,' 2 a
range of direct use techniques have demonstrated wetlands' mone-
tary value, including their value as a habitat for commercially har-
vested fish and animal species,'83 their wildlife and visual-cultural
benefits,'84 their use as recreational areas,'8 and their indirect bene-
fits as municipal water sources.'
86 The precautionary principle'
7
further supports the economic value of conserving wetlands in light
of their continuing loss and their potential, but uncertain, signifi-
cance to the environment. 8
179. See R. Kerry Turner, Wetland Conservation: Economics and Ethics, in
ECONOMICS, GROWTH AND SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTS 121, 122 (D. Collard
et al. eds., 1988).
180. PEARCE & TURNER, supra note 90, at 321.
181. See id. at 323 (listing various important wetland uses according to the
four wetland types: floodplains, coastal wetlands, wet meadows, and peatland).
The benefits of wetlands often extend beyond the utility of the wetlands them-
selves and have global importance. See id.; see also Ramsar Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2,
1971, 11 I.L.M. 963 [hereinafter Ramsar Convention] (describing the Ramsar
Convention as "an intergovernmental treaty which provides the framework for
national action and international cooperation for the conservation and wise use of
wetlands and their resources").
182. See PEARCE & TURNER, supra note 90, at 324 (noting the difficulty in
quantifying such values). Studies of other environmental resources suggest, how-
ever, that the existence values of wetlands are positive. See id.
183. See id. at 327-28 (citing a study on shellfish and fish output).
184. See id. at 328 (estimating the value of these benefits through the use of
market land prices).
185. See id. at 329 (noting a study using the travel cost method).
186. See id. at 331-33 (noting that several locations used an alterna-
tive/substitute cost approach).
187. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
188. See PEARCE & TURNER, supra note 90, at 335.
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The Kyoto Protocol to the Convention on Climate Change"' sug-
gests the growing international acceptance of the view that envi-
ronmental damage is monetizable. The Kyoto Protocol, which
seeks to limit the emission of greenhouse gases into the environ-
ment, will impose emission reduction obligations on developed
country Parties and Parties that are undergoing the transition to a
market economy.9 After considerable debate,'"' the Parties ulti-
mately agreed to authorize "emissions trading," whereby a Party
with an emission reduction commitment may "buy" part of the
emissions budget of another Party where it would be more cost-
effective to do so, rather than undertake the reduction domesti-
cally.92 That the Protocol places a monetary value on emissions re-
duction, and that it authorizes a State Party to buy the reduction
obligations of another State party, suggests international acceptance
of the basic premises of environmental valuation techniques.
C. THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
The invaluable nature of the world's oceans makes them par-
ticularly appropriate for the application of environmental econom-
ics and its various methodologies. Oceans cover seventy percent of
the surface of the globe and play a central role in the biochemical
processes of the planet at local, regional, and global levels.'"' The
oceans' profound economic importance is expressed through a
range of activities, including fishing, aquatic and semi-aquatic
farming, transportation of goods, tourism, recreation, oil produc-
189. See Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change: Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto
Protocol].
190. See Brendan P. McGivem, hItroductorn" Note, in id., 37 I.L.M. at 22-29
(describing the specific articles in the agreement that outline the responsibilities
of "developed countries, economies in transition, and developing countries").
191. See, e.g., Remember Global Warming?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1998, at
A26 (describing the insistence by the United States that the Protocol contain an
emissions trading provision).
192. See Brendan P. McGivem, Introductor. Note, in Kyoto Protocol, supra
note 189, 37 I.L.M. at 22.
193. See Alicia Barcena, Some Reflections on a New Approach to Ocean and
Coastal Management, in MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 90, at 23.
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tion, and use as a repository for wastes. 194 For example, the world's
oceans yield a total of 80-90 million tons of fish per year, providing
a livelihood to millions of people living in coastal areas.'9 ' In addi-
tion, the environment of the coastal zone, which consists of conti-
nental shelves and continental plains, 6 supports much of the
world's population 97 and possesses great economic value. 9"
As a result of the Third Law of the Sea Convention, existing
models of regional programs and cooperation, and the experience in
ocean issues of several United Nation agencies, such as the IMO
and UNEP, oceans and coastal areas present an opportunity to put
sustainable development into action.'99 Several studies demonstrate
the feasibility of applying cost-benefit analysis to the marine envi-
ronment.2°' A number of studies also demonstrate both the eco-
nomic benefits of improvements in the marine environment'20 and
194. See id. at 23-24.
195. See id. at 33 (explaining that ninety-five percent of the fish are caught
within the 200-mile boundary of the EEZ).
196. See Danny L. Elder, International Union for Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources, in MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 90, at 56 (finding that
numerous special characteristics of the coastal zone include the presence of di-
verse ecosystems such as inter-tidal mud-flats, rocky shores, sandy beaches,
mangroves, salt marshes, estuaries and other wetlands, seagrass and seaweed
beds, and coral reefs). These various ecosystems are vital for coastal protection
and productivity. See id. at 53.
197. See id. at 56 (estimating that six out often people live within 50 kilome-
ters of coastal waters and that two-thirds of the world's cities containing popula-
tions of 2.5 million or more are located near tidal estuaries).
198. See Alicia Barcena, Some Reflections on a New Approach to Ocean and
Coastal Management, in MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 90, at 26-30 (noting
that the economic value of coastal areas includes their use for fishing, human
settlement, aquaculture, port development, shipping, marine and coastal trans-
port, tourism, recreation, erosion control, and protection against storms and epi-
sodic damages).
199. See id. at 2.
200. See Hanson, supra note 93, at 642-44.
201. See, e.g., John E. Bardach, Economic Contributions of Environmental
Uses of the Oceans: Aquaculture, Energy Pollution, and Ocean Minerals, in
ROLE OF OCEANS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 93, at 621-25
(noting how the addition of iron to trace-element-poor but nutrient-rich areas of
oceans that increases the production of microalgae may lead to the establishment
of new food webs, the alteration of existing ones, and, possibly, to the availabil-
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the cost of marine development.2" Land-based measures that lead to
improvements in the marine environment may also have economic
benefits. For example, afforestation, or tree planting, can augment
the catching of fish, thus raising income among fisherman.' '
Biological diversity represents another important economic value
of the marine environment.2 04 Economic uses include food and
cosmetics, industrial chemicals and dyes, and a host of other com-
mercial products.0 5 Coral reefs, one of the most biologically diverse
and productive natural ecosystems in the marine environment, pro-
vide not only the basis for significant economic and cultural activi-
ties through fisheries and tourism, but also the sheltered waters that
attract human settlement. More generally, the development of
commercial products made possible by biological diversity has be-
come a multi-billion dollar industry.2"'
MACPAs, or MPAs, represent an increasingly important mecha-
ity of more harvestable products).
202. See, e.g., ECONOMIC VALUATION TECHNIQUES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: A
CASE STUDY WORKBOOK 102 (John A. Dixon & Maynard M. Hufschmidt eds.,
1986) (discussing a study focused on the valuation of marine production lost
when fishermen sold their fishing rights to the government in order for the land
to be reclaimed); see also Hanson, supra note 93, at 655-56 (arguing that the idea
of environmental accounting needs to treat the sustainable development of the
ocean as an investment theme, recognizing the "fundamental links between pov-
erty and environmental degradation").
203. See Teruji Sakamaya, A System of Sustainable Coast Fisheries in Japan,
in THE ROLE OF OCEANS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 93, at 598-
601.
204. See, e.g., A. Charlotte de Fontaubert et al.. inplementing the Convention
on Biological Diversity in Marine and Coastal Habitats, 10 GEO. INT'L EN\TrL.
L. REv. 753, 755, 776 (1982). Major threats to marine biological diversity in-
clude physical and chemical alteration, toxic pollution, marine debris, incidental
take, and over-harvesting. See Alicia Barcena, Sone Reflections on a New Ap-
proach to Ocean and Coastal Managenient, in MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra
note 90, at 37. Although it is not yet possible to determine exactly the losses,
there has been significant damage to coastal areas, such as wetlands, coral reefs,
seagrass-beds, and mangroves, due to developmental activities. See it.
205. See Fontaubert et al., supra note 204, at 762.
206. See Eichbaum et al., supra note 119, at 61: see also Exec. Order No.
13,089, 3 C.F.R. 193 (1998) (discussing the "economic value of U.S. coral reef
systems to the marine environment").
207. See Pollack, supra note 127, at Al, C12 (describing the overall growth of
the industry and various commercial products that have been developed).
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nism to advance the protection of biodiversity.20 Once rigid, limited
marine management tools, MACPAs now range from small, closed
areas or harvest refugia that are established to protect a specific re-
source or habitat type to extensive, multi-use areas that integrate
the management of many species under a single comprehensive
plan.2 MACPAs have proven economic value:
Marine protected areas are important economically because they con-
tribute to the creation ofjobs and services that are important for tourism
and recreation. They play an increasingly critical role in sustaining
commercially or locally important marine resources such as fisheries. In
addition, marine protected areas can be used for the preservation of
cultural and archaeological sites. They can also serve as institutional
frameworks for resolving user conflicts and can provide small-scale
models of integrated coastal management.""
Preservation of the marine environment through devices like
MACPAs can bring net economic benefits and sustainable devel-
opment,"' thus demonstrating why marine conservation can con-
208. See generally Eichbaum et al., supra note 119, at 60, 63 (noting that
MACPAs can protect marine biological diversity by protecting endangered spe-
cies, critical habitats, seed banks, and sources of recruits through the creation of
nonextractive zones or harvest refugia). For previous discussions of MACPAs,
see supra notes 118-19 and 133-33 and accompanying text.
209. See id. at 63. One of the early such areas was Great Barrier Reef Marine
Park, a multi-use protected area established by Australia in 1975. The Great Bar-
rier Reef supports industries that contribute $1 billion (Australian) dollars to the
Australian economy each year from tourism and commercial fishing. See Ottesen
et al., supra note 71, at 507; Danny L. Elder, International Union for Conserva-
tion of Nature and Natural Resources, in MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 90,
at 69 (finding that the existing network of MPAs is less developed than their ter-
restrial counterparts).
210. Fontaubert et al., supra note 204, at 775; see also KELLEHER &
KENCHINGTON, supra note 54, at 16 (stating that an MPA's economic importance
may be defined as its "existing or potential contribution to economic value by
virtue of its protection, e.g., the protection of an area for recreation, subsistence,
use by traditional inhabitants, appreciation by tourists and others or as a refuge
nursery area or source of supply for economically important species"); Danny L.
Elder, International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, in
MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 90, at 70 (observing that MPAs can "serve as
replenishment areas for marine resources and should be designed to maintain the
genetic diversity of key species").
211. See Alicia Barcena, Some Reflections on a New Approach to Ocean and
Coastal Management, in MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 90, at 55.
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stitute an economic use within the meaning of Article 121(3). For
example, a State that establishes a marine park or protected area
around a pristine coral reef should not be penalized by being forced
to forego the expansion of its maritime jurisdiction that it would
likely have gained from pursuing a more traditional form of eco-
nomic development. Instead such States should be given an incen-
tive to preserve the marine environment where such preservation is
also economically beneficial and thus consistent with the "eco-
nomic life" criterion of Article 121(3).
IV. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED
INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 121(3)
Returning to the hypothetical debate posed at the outset, it should
now be evident that the proposal to establish a marine preserve
around a small island can in fact represent an economically benefi-
cial, if not optimal, use of this natural resource. Measures to protect
the marine environment can yield economic benefits in various
forms, including increased fishing stocks, tourist spending, prod-
ucts from coral reefs, and health benefits from reduced pollution.
Such measures can and should satisfy the "economic life of their
own" requirement of Article 121(3), thus enabling a "rock" to
achieve the formal legal status of an "island," and thereby poten-
tially extending a coastal State's continental shelf and EEZ rights.
This interpretation of Article 121(3) is consistent with UNCLOS
III's text, UNCLOS Ill's objects and aims, subsequent develop-
ments in international law, and the public policy of preserving the
marine environment where it is economically beneficial to do so.
This approach could, however, face obstacles in practice. For ex-
ample, there is continuing tension between the attempt by coastal
States to protect their waters by adopting environmental controls
and the desire of maritime States to preserve the traditional rights
of innocent passage and freedom of navigation.' 2 Indeed, in ex-
panding the jurisdiction of coastal States to enforce marine envi-
ronmental protection standards, such as those relating to vessel-
source pollution, UNCLOS III may have increased this tension.!'
212. See Bodansky, supra note 79, at 720-21.
213. See id.
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Accordingly, by providing another way in which UNCLOS III ex-
pands the jurisdiction of coastal States, the proposal outlined in this
Article could engender further opposition from maritime States de-
termined to protect the freedom of the seas. However, since such
expansion would interfere only with the right to develop the af-
fected area, and would not otherwise pose a threat to high seas
navigation rights, this tension would be limited.2 14 The real risk of
tension exists where one State's additional continental shelf and
EEZ rights are extended into an area previously claimed by an op-
posite or adjacent coastal State.
A. POSSIBLE GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES BETWEEN
COASTAL STATES OVER ARTICLE 121(3)
Assume State A and State B are located across from each other,
separated by fifty miles of sea. Determined to protect the marine
environment, State A establishes a marine preserve on one of its
"rocks" twenty miles off its coast and thus outside the twelve-mile
limit of its territorial sea. State A then demonstrates the preserve's
economic value: the protection of a pristine coral reef and rare spe-
cies with the potential for commercial use in connection with health
care products. The "rock" thus attains the legal status of an island
under Article 121(3); consequently, State A's continental shelf and
EEZ is henceforth measured from the island, as opposed to from
State A's own coast, potentially extending its jurisdiction up to
State B's territorial sea.
State B subsequently challenges State A's expansion of its mari-
time jurisdiction. State B claims that the preserve has no economic
benefit but rather was established by State A solely for the purpose
of expanding its maritime jurisdiction. State B further argues that
even if the marine preserve has an economic benefit, it is nonethe-
less unfair to use this "rock" in establishing the maritime boundary
between the two States. State B notes that were it not for this
214. Cf Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 58, para. I (stating that
within the EEZ, states still enjoy the high seas "freedoms . . . of navigation and
overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other inten-
tionally lawful uses of the seas related to these freedoms"); Bodansky, supra note
79, at 756 (noting that although "UNCLOS III's provisions on the EEZ represent
a considerable expansion of coastal state jurisdiction, that jurisdiction remains
highly circumscribed").
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"rock," State A's jurisdiction would extend only to the midpoint
between the two States, twenty-five miles from each State's
coast.215
Several safeguards may be instituted to address State B's first
concern, that State A has in effect made a self-serving marine pre-
serve dedication solely for purpose of expanding its maritime
boundaries, without any demonstration of the area's economic
value. State A could be required to show that the marine preserve
would deliver economic benefits through one of the various envi-
ronmental valuation techniques. ' 6 Standards could be developed
not only through adjudication, but also by the International Mari-
time Organization ("IMO"),' a specialized agency of the United
Nations that increasingly supports coastal and broader environ-
mental interests, 18 and under whose auspices UNCLOS III's re-
quirements for vessel-source pollution have already been fulfilled
through the adoption of various international conventions.!" Fur-
thermore, State A could be required to demonstrate that its pro-
posed marine preserve is part of a concentrated and coherent envi-
ronmental management plan. Finally, State A must commit to
maintain the marine preserve in perpetuity, helping ensure that it
will establish a marine preserve only if such preserve represents the
area's highest and best use.
With respect to State B's concern about the fairness of the is-
land's use in a maritime delimitation between the two States, any
distorting effects may be avoided or mitigated by the application of
215. See supra note 11 (describing the equidistance rule).
216. See supra notes 158-172 and accompanying text.
217. See Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organi-
zation, Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 622, 289 U.N.T.S. 48.
218. See Bodansky, supra note 79, at 725-26 (discussing the changing role of
the IMO).
219. See Patricia W. Bimie, Small Cetaceans and the International Whaling
Commission, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 1. 5 (1997) (stating that the ap-
proximately forty adopted IMO Conventions are significant in the marine envi-
ronment protection arena); see also Tiffani Y. Lee, Note, Environmental Liability
Provisions Under the U.N. Compensation Commission: Remarkable Achieve-
ment with Room for Improved Deterrence, 1 GEO. INr'L ENVrL. L. REV. 209,
228 (1998) (discussing the IMO's role in the clean-up of oil spills following the
Gulf War).
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some basic principles of maritime delimitation. One option would
be to grant State A's island its own territorial sea, but to ignore the
island in any maritime delimitation between the two States.22' The
foregoing may be completed through the creation of an enclave
around the island in instances where that island fell on the "other
side" of the median line-in other words, in instances where that
island fell within State B's jurisdiction under the equidistance
rule.22' Another possibility would be to provide State A's island
with "half-effect," as was done in the arbitration between the
United Kingdom and France over the Scilly Islands... and by the
ICJ in the Tunisian-Libyan Continental Shelf Case.223 The method
of giving half-effect consists in delimiting the line equidistant be-
tween the two coasts, first without the use of the off-shore island as
a base-point, and second with its use as a base-point. A boundary
giving half-effect to the island is the line drawn mid-way between
those two equidistance lines.224 The decision to give half-effect to
islands provides a way to abate the inequitable effects of distorting
geographical features.' A third option includes conceding only a
territorial sea to State A's island, but then ignoring the islands
nearer to State B's coast in calculating the median line between the
two States. 26
A slightly different problem could arise if both State A and State
220. See HIRAN W. JAYEWARDENE, THE REGIME OF ISLANDS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 354 (1990) (discussing the possibility of ignoring small,
insignificant islands without human habitation for equidistant purposes, but
nonetheless granting them their own belts of territorial waters).
221. See SYMMONS, supra note 7, at 193; Dubai/Sharjah Border Arbitration,
91 I.L.R. 543, 677 (Court of Arbitration 1981) (finding that this option was car-
tied out in the Dubai/Sharjah Border Arbitration).
222. See Arbitration between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland and the French Republic on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
(June 30, 1977), para. 251, reprinted in 18 I.L.M 397, 455 (1979) [hereinafter
Arbitration between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland].
223. See Continental Shelf (Tunis v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, para. 129 (Feb.
24) (giving "half effect" to the Kerkennah Islands).
224. See Arbitration between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, supra
note 222, para. 251, 18 I.L.M at 455.
225. See id. (applying this principle to the Scilly Islands).
226. See D.P. O'CONNELL, 2 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 720 (l.A.
Shearer ed., 1984).
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B simultaneously established a marine preserve on one of their
small islands located outside their respective territorial seas. Each
State could argue that its "rock" should be treated as an island be-
cause of the marine preserve, and thus claim the entire area be-
tween its coast and the other State's territorial sea.
This type of dispute may be resolved as follows. ' First, the
claims of each State would be evaluated rigorously in the manner
proposed above to assure the validity of each State's Article 121(3)
claim. Assuming both marine preserves had a demonstrable eco-
nomic benefit, the focus would shift to previous cooperation, if any,
between the States. The Third UNCLOS calls for States to cooper-
ate, on a global or regional basis, to protect and preserve the marine
environment.2 Cooperation includes the immediate notification of
imminent danger to the marine environment ' and contingency
plans to prevent or minimize the environmental damage,-" the pro-
motion of studies and the exchange of information about marine
pollution,nI and the establishment of scientific criteria to formulate
rules, standards, and practices to protect the marine environment. : ,:
Each State would then be required to demonstrate that it had at-
tempted to cooperate in these ways, but that it was unable to enlist
the assistance of the other State, or that such assistance was not fea-
sible, for example, because of the opposition of other, more power-
ful States in the region. A State's previous (and unjustifiable) re-
fusal to cooperate would trigger the dismissal of its claim for
extended jurisdiction under Article 121(3). This emphasis on coop-
227. This method would also provide for the resolution of disputes where only
one State relies on the establishment of a marine preserve in a maritime delimi-
tation and the other State's claim rests on other bases.
228. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 197 (providing that
States consider regional characteristics of the environment when deciding on in-
ternational rules and standards for the protection of marine environment).
229. See id. art. 198 (requiring States to notify international organizations as
well as its own neighbors who may be affected by the damage).
230. See id. art. 199 (requiring States to respond to pollution incidents through
jointly-developed contingency plans).
231. See id. art. 200 (requiring States to research and share information on ma-
rine life and assessments of pollution in marine areas).
232. See id. art. 201 (furthering cooperation by creating measures to prevent,
reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment).
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eration would encourage States to reach bi- or multi-lateral solu-
tions to environmental problems, rather than to advance their own
interests unilaterally. If, nevertheless, both States had tried to coop-
erate or cooperation was not possible, the dispute could be resolved
by applying one of the various principles of maritime delimitation
previously described2 3 or by applying the equidistance line and
treating the islands as canceling out each other's effect.
3 4
In sum, one State's expansion of its maritime jurisdiction
through the establishment of a marine preserve on or around a
small island need not come at the expense of an adjacent coastal
State. It also need not dramatically alter the balance of power be-
tween the two States or among the States in the region as a whole.
For example, the fact that a State establishes a marine preserve
would neither automatically entitle it to oil rights over an area also
claimed by and/or located in close proximity to another State, nor
to the expansion of its maritime boundaries at the expense of the
high seas, even though the preserve technically fell within the
State's 200-mile EEZ. As discussed above, existing principles of
maritime delimitation offer ways to mitigate, if not eliminate, any
such dislocations caused by the expansion of one State's maritime
jurisdiction.23 ' However, ultimately such determinations of Article
121(3) claims are extremely fact intensive and may best be fleshed
out on a case-by-case basis through UNCLOS III's dispute resolu-
236tion process.
B. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES UNDER UNCLOS III
Part XV of the Third UNCLOS sets forth a detailed scheme of
dispute resolution 237 that may assist in resolving disputes engen-
233. See supra notes 220-226 and accompanying text.
234. See O'CONNELL, supra note 226, at 720.
235. See supra notes 220-31 an accompanying text.
236. Cf Bodansky, supra note 79, at 767 (describing how UNCLOS III's dis-
pute resolution process would help resolve conflicts between coastal and mari-
time States over vessel-source pollution).
237. See generally John King Gamble, Jr., The 1982 Convention on the Law of
the Sea: Binding Dispute Settlement?, 9 B.U. INT'L L.J. 39, 57 (1991) (stating
that UNCLOS III's dispute settlement provisions "stand as an important accom-
plishment for international law").
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dered by the interpretation of Article 121(3) proposed here. The
Convention's dispute resolution scheme is divided into three sec-
tions. Section One authorizes State parties to choose a dispute pro-
cedure as long as a binding decision results." ' Section Two, which
operates only in the event that Section One fails, and which is sub-
ject to the narrow exceptions of Section Three, establishes a com-
pulsory dispute settlement system for binding decisions. In addi-
tion, Section Two allows States to choose among the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ("ITLOS"), the ICJ, and a special
arbitral tribunal.2 0 Section Three exempts a limited number of dis-
putes from the compulsory dispute settlement system of Section
Two, including a wide range of boundary determinations between
opposite or adjacent States, such as those involving the territorial
sea, EEZ, and Continental Shelf.
24'
So, while the Third UNCLOS cannot guarantee compulsory set-
tlement of a wide range of disputes, it encourages States to seek
resolution of such disputes 2 and, more importantly, provides a
framework within which they may in fact do so. Moreover, over
time, fora, such as the ITLOS, could develop rules to resolve dis-
putes involving Article 121(3). In addition, were a non-party in-
volved in such a dispute, the ICJ could exercise jurisdiction, wholly
apart from UNCLOS III, under Section 36(2) of the Statute of the
ICJ,243 if both parties had consented to the ICJ's jurisdiction.
C. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS AND ENFORCING COMMITMENTS
UNDER ARTICLE 121(3)
Finally, the proposal presented in this Article raises the concern
that a State, despite its commitment to maintain a marine preserve
238. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 1, arts. 279-85.
239. See id. arts. 286-99 (delineating the dispute settlement process).
240. See id. art. 287, para. 1.
241. See id. art. 298, para. l(a)(i).
242. See id. art. 298, para. l(a)(i) (following the failure to resolve a dispute
excepted from the procedures of Section Two, one State may require submission
of the dispute to a non-binding conciliation commission).
243. See Statute of International Court of Justice, art. 36, par. 2, 59 Stat. 1055
(entered into force Oct. 24, 1945) (setting forth the types of disputes that may be
reconciled between consenting States).
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in perpetuity, might later decide to pursue economic development
in that particular area. How can the international community guar-
antee that such commitment will continue to be honored into the
future, and not merely serve as a convenient and costless predicate
by which a State may expand maritime jurisdiction?
The conservation easement offers a promising means of ensuring
a State's compliance with its commitment under Article 121(3). An
increasingly popular alternative to State regulation among both
conservationists and property owners,"' conservation easements
have been used for various purposes, including protecting wetlands
and limiting land use.245
Easements are a property concept developed by common law
systems. The creation of an easement traditionally meant that the
owner of the burdened property was not the only person who pos-
sessed a right to that property since the easement holder also main-
tained limited property rights. Conservation easements, a type of
easement, 1 7 are created when the owner transfers some or all of hisrights to develop the property to a government or non-government
244. See, e.g., John L. Hollingshead, Conservation Easements: A Flexible Tool
for Land Preservation, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 319, 323 (1997) (noting the appeal of
conservation easements over traditional land-use measures, due to the fact they
are voluntary, flexible, and self implementing).
245. See id. at 333 (recounting the earliest use of conservation easements in
Massachusetts in the 1880s and their present day use in wetlands for the protec-
tion of migratory waterfowl); see also id. ("The primary impetus for the use of
the modem conservation easements [in the United States] was the protection of
scenic views along highways."). Conservation easements have become an in-
creasingly widespread alternative to state regulation in common-law countries
such as the United States and Canada. See Ian Bowles et al., Economic Incentives
and Legal Tools for Private Sector Conservation, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
209, 213 (1998) (describing the formation of conservation easements). Their use
is also increasing in civil law jurisdictions. See id. at 216 (noting that Costa Rica
has used conservation easements to protect the cloud and rain forests).
246. See Bowles et al., supra note 245, at 212 (teaching that the utility of
property cannot interfere with easement rights).
247. Originally, easements could exist only if they benefited one parcel of
land, the "dominant tenement," by burdening another, the "servient tenement."
See id. Conservation easements became possible only when common law juris-
dictions started to eliminate the requirement of a dominant and servient tene-
ment, thus allowing for easements not connected to another piece of land. See id.
at 213.
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agency.4 ' A conservation easement provides its holder-who acts
as a trustee for the public-with the right to prevent certain kinds of
uses of the owner's property. The landowner's use of that property
is thereafter restricted to the terms of the easement; otherwise, the
holder of the easement may sue for enforcement.
In the case of Article 121(3), an international non-government
organization, or another State in the region with a direct interest in
ensuring that the coastal State's environmental commitment is en-
forced, would hold the easement. The easement holder would be
given a supervisory role over the protected area and would have
standing to assert conservation rights if the coastal State trans-
gressed its commitment. The conservation easement thus offers a
way to ensure a State's commitment to a marine preserve by effec-
tively tying the hands not only of the administration that establishes
the preserve but future governments as well.
Conversely, however, there is the possibility that a State's com-
mitment under Article 121(3) might be made too inflexible, not al-
lowing for significant and unforeseen changes. For example, what
if the economic value of a marine preserve is lost because the
unique species that provided its economic value becomes extinct?
The conservation easement may again offer a solution, as it pro-
vides for its own termination upon some specified event, such as
changed circumstances affecting the environmental or economic
value of the island.249 Alternatively, a conservation easement may
be reformed if its express purpose can no longer be satisfied by ap-
plication of the cy pres doctrine. - Here, that doctrine would allow
248. See id. Conservation easements may be either positive or negative.
Whereas a positive conservation easement provides the public with the right to
engage in a specified use of the property, such as fishing in adjacent streams, a
negative conservation easement restricts the burdened landowner's right to use
the land. See Jeffery A. Blackie, Note, Conservation Easements and the Doctrine
of Changed Conditions, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1193-94 (1989).
249. See Hollingshead, supra note 244, at 328-29 (discussing ways in which
common law easements could terminate).
250. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, sec. 399 (1959).
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose,
and it becomes impossible or impracticle ... to carry out the particular pur-
pose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to devote the
property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will di-
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the easement holder to request, and a tribunal to substitute, another
plan of administration that is believed to mirror the original plan as
closely as possible."' Thus, if the species that gave the marine pre-
serve its principal economic value unforeseeably became extinct,
the coastal State could pursue a limited form of economic devel-
opment that did not harm the environment and that promoted that
State's existing commitment under Article 121(3). In contrast, a
State's sudden need for short-term revenue to address an economic
downturn at home would not justify the application of cy pres since
it would in no way invalidate the purpose of the marine preserve.
Similarly, greater economic development in the region as a whole
would not be a changed condition justifying the application of cy
pres since the economic value of the preserved area, now an even
scarcer resource, would actually be greater.
Conservation easements have proven to be an effective means of
achieving sustainable development. Their increasing importance
supports the premise outlined in this Article: that the "best use" of
the sea may in some instances be to preserve it for posterity, rather
than to develop it to attain the highest short-term economic gain.2' 2
CONCLUSION
The ocean is an invaluable resource whose protection is a grow-
ing focus of international law. The Third UNCLOS plays a vital
role in this process and should be interpreted, where possible, to
protect the marine environment. A marine preserve that not only
protects the marine environment but also advances a State's eco-
rect the application of the property to some charitable purpose which falls
within the general charitable intention of the settlor.
Id.
251. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES), sec. 8.5 (dis-
cussing the application of cy pres to conservation easements); Blackie, supra
note 248, at 1216-17 (same).
252. See Blackie, supra note 248, at 1203.
The best use of a river may not be to dam it up and then distribute the water
to irrigate farmland, but rather, allow it to run unfettered to the sea .... The
best use of forestland may not be timber supply but rather support, in an un-
disturbed state, of the ecosystems that depend on it. In short, best use should
not always be determined by the highest market price.
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nomic interests should be considered to have an "economic life of
[its] own" under Article 121(3). There is perhaps no better way to
protect the marine environment than to reward those States that
prove that environmental protection makes sense from the stand-
point of economic development.
